(1.) THE challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal is to the impugned judgment of the trial court dated 22.7.1997, and by which judgment the court below dismissed the suit filed on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs for cancellation of two sale deeds dated 19.8.1994, which the plaintiffs no.2 to 4 had executed in favour of the defendant no.1.
(2.) THE case as set up in the plaint was in two parts. First part of the plaint pertains to the narration of facts qua the rights of plaintiff no.1, who claimed that there was an Agreement to Sell in his favour by the plaintiffs no. 2 to 4 and which Agreement to Sell was dated 22.5.1994. In a way therefore, so far as plaintiff no.1 is concerned, he admittedly did not have complete ownership title in the suit property but was only a prospective purchaser under the Agreement to Sell dated 22.5.1994. So far as the plaintiff nos. 2 to 4 are concerned, the cause of action averred in the plaint was that the sale deeds were got executed from them by misrepresentation by the defendant no.1 inasmuch as it was represented that the defendant no.1 is the brother of the plaintiff no.1, and on which representation, the sale deeds dated 19.8.1994 were said to have been executed.
(3.) I need not go into the merits of the controversy in this case in view of the agreed stands of the parties before me. So far as the rights of the plaintiff no.1 are concerned, it is agreed that the plaintiff no.1/appellant no.1 has filed a suit for specific performance of his agreement dated 22.5.1994 entered into between the appellant no.1 and the appellant nos. 2 to 4/plaintiff nos. 2 to 4. In this suit, the present defendant no.1/respondent no.1 has also been made a defendant and it is claimed that this defendant no.1/respondent no.1 would not have any right in the suit property by virtue of the fact that the Agreement to Sell dated 22.5.1994 is prior in point of time and the defendant no.1 is not a bonafide purchaser for value/consideration and such issues and rights will be decided in that suit for specific performance. I may note that an earlier Agreement to Sell prevails over a subsequent sale by virtue of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, if it is held that the subsequent purchaser is not a bonafide purchaser for value. That is an aspect which is not before me and is an issue in the suit for specific performance, and in which, the same will be decided uninfluenced by any observations made in today's order or in the impugned judgment dated 22.7.1997. I may add here that the plaintiff nos. 2 to 4/appellant nos. 2 to 4 herein are the defendants in the suit for specific performance filed by present appellant no.1 and these persons are not disputing the rights of the appellant no.1 herein under the Agreement to Sell dated 22.5.1994.