STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs. VIJAY LAKSHMI THAKRAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 the appellant seeks to set aside the judgment and decree dated 11.11.2002 passed by the Court of the ADJ, Delhi whereby the suit for recovery filed by the respondent was decreed in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

(2.) Brief facts of the case relevant for deciding the present appeal are that the respondent is the widow of late Sh. Satish Chander Thukral who was working as an officer in the State Bank Of India and had expired on 22.11.84 leaving behind the respondent widow and his mother as legal heirs. That after the death of her husband, the respondent vide her application dated 29.3.85 requested the appellant bank to release his terminal dues like provident fund and gratuity, etc. In response, when the Bank asked the respondent to submit the requisite papers including the succession certificate, she was unable to do so due to the inter se disputes between the legal heirs. For this purpose, the respondent had approached the concerned civil court which granted the succession certificate on 4.6.97 in favour of the respondent. On furnishing the same on 6.6.97, the Bank released the terminal dues of the deceased in October, 1997 but did not pay any interest on the amount for the delayed period. The respondent consequently filed a suit for recovery of the interest which vide judgment and decree dated 11.11.2002 was decreed in favour of the respondent for a sum of Rs.3,76,404 alongwith costs and pendentalite and future interest @10.5% p.a. Feeling aggrieved with the same, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

(3.) Mr. S.L. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit filed by the respondent was clearly barred by limitation as the time prescribed for filing of the recovery suit against the bank is three years, the same being a simple recovery suit. The contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the ld. Trial Court has wrongly observed that the succession certificate was a money decree which can be executed within a period of 12 years. Counsel further submitted that before the Succession Court the appellant was not a party and in any case the succession certificate cannot be enforced as a money decree against the appellant bank, the same being a decision by the succession court inter se between the legal heirs of the deceased employee of the bank. Counsel thus stated that the suit for recovery filed by the respondent was clearly barred by limitation. The other argument raised by the counsel for the appellant was that the appellant was not liable to pay the interest on the amount of gratuity and the provident fund as the appellant had never shown any reluctance to pay the amount of terminal dues to the legal heirs of the deceased employee and it was only on account of the inter se dispute between the legal heirs that the appellant bank was prevented from releasing the amount of the provident fund and the gratuity. Counsel further invited attention of this court to the letter dated 16.05.1985 (Ex. DW 1/3) addressed by the nominee of the deceased employee as well as the injunction order dated 20.9.85 granted by the Succession Court. Counsel thus stated that it was not the fault of the appellant bank but due to the infighting of the legal heirs themselves due to which the appellant could not make the timely payment of the said dues. Counsel also submitted that the Rule 359 on which the ld. Trial court placed reliance is not applicable to the instant facts; firstly, because the said rule is from a reference book which has no binding effect on the appellant and secondly even under the reference book in the illustration (3) of Rule 362 it has been clearly provided that the nominee/legal heirs are entitled for interest from the date of submission of the application in the prescribed format and not from the date of the death of the member. The contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the application in the prescribed format for seeking release of the said amount was made by the wife of the deceased employee only after the grant of the succession certificate and not prior thereto. Counsel also placed reliance on sub Section 3A of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, proviso of which clearly provides that the interest shall not be paid by the employer if there is a delay on the part of the employee in claiming the said payment. The appellant submitted that in fact the appellant bank has its own rules which govern the payment of gratuity and the provident fund. Counsel also invited attention of the Court to Rule 33 of the SBI Employees Provident Fund Rules which states that interest on the money standing in the books of the fund to the credit of a member shall cease on the day such particular employee leaves the service of the bank or on the day when he dies, whichever event shall happen first. The contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the said rules governing the Provident Fund and Gratuity have been framed by the appellant bank deriving its power from Section 50(2)(o) of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 and thus have a statutory force. Counsel thus submitted that the provident fund amount and the gratuity amount were immediately released by the appellant bank after the respondent had submitted the succession certificate along with application in the duly prescribed form. Counsel also submitted that the respondent has claimed the amount in suit for the payment of interest at one particular rate of 9% p.a. and then charging the interest at the higher interest rate @ 18% p.a. while calculating the decreetal amount and this fact has been overlooked by the learned trial court while granting relief to the respondent. Counsel for the appellant hence submitted that in any event of the matter the appellant is not legally obligated to pay the interest amount.