NARINDER KAUR Vs. TEJINDER KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is not expected to exercise Jurisdiction for substituting its own appreciation of the case with that of the Courts below. This is especially so where, as in the present case, there is concurrent finding of fact and law of the Courts below. Learned counsel for the Petitioner is unable to disclose any reason for me to exercise this superintending Jurisdiction, as neither of the Courts below had acted beyond their authority or had discharged their functions in a manner which was, legally improper. This would have been sufficient reason for me to dismiss the petition. The facts of the case are so singular that they have incensed judicial conscience as they disclose how a party can abuse the Judicial process and thereby cause a miscarriage of justice.

(2.) The first legal action taken was the filing of a petition for eviction under Section 14(l)(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by Smt. Tejinder Kaur against Shri Surinder Singh Bajaj. This proved unsuccessful. This was followed by a petition under Section 14 (l)(a) of the Act. After the tenant Shri Surinder Singh Bajaj was purportedly and allegedly served, Shri O.P. Bajaj, an Advocate appeared on his behalf and presented a facile and impotent defence. The Rent Control Tribunal has understandably viewed this legal effort op behalf of tenant as a "dummy written Statement, offered a friendly contest and suffered an eviction order."

(3.) The tenant was evicted from the premises on 15.1.1990 when he was proceeded ex parte, conveniently, after the filing of the sterile defence. On 19.1.1990 he filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13 and Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being put back in the demised premises. The Courts below were satisfied that the tenant signature on the A.D. pertaining to the Notice of Demand and the A.D. pertaining to the eviction petition, as well as on the vakalatnama of Shri O.P. Bajaj were all forged. In my view it is essential for an Advocate to conduct such enquiry as he may consider necessary in order to ascertain whether the person signing a vakalatnama in his favour is actually the person who he represents himself to be. In the present case, as an Officer of the Court, Shri O.P. Bajaj, Advocate, was duty bound to ensure that the person who engaged him was not masquerading as the tenant. I shall say no more on his conduct.