MAHINDER KUMAR Vs. SEEMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The contention of the Petitioner/Tenant is that both the Courts below have committed an error of law in dismissing the Tenant's Objections dated 16.12.1999, filed under Section 47 read with Order XXI, Rule 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as the additional Objection, dated 30.3..2001. It-is strongly contended by Mr. Ravi Gupta, .Learned Counsel for the Tenant firstly, that the Respondent/Landlord/Owner has concealed that she has other reasonably suitable accommodation although no such plea had been raised in the Written Statement. The Additional Rent Controller had in fact dealt with each of the properties mentioned by the Petitioner/Tenant and found even on merits, that neither were available to the Landlady. Secondly, it has been argued that two tenants have vacated two rooms and the bona fide need does not subsist. Even on this issue the Additional Rent Controller had returned the finding that on a perusal of the Eviction Order dated 21.7.1998 it is palpably clear that even if these two rooms are taken into consideration, since the established/proved bona fide need of the Landlady was of six-seven rooms, her requirements were not satisfied. The Additional Rent Controller went into -the merits of the Objections despite her having observed that the tenant cannot be allowed the luxury of a second round of litigation.

(2.) The Additional Rent "Control Tribunal had dismissed the Petitioner/Tenant's appeal by his Judgement dated 24.7.2001. It has already been observed that for Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to come into play, the Judgment Debtor must disclose that the Decree has been satisfied or discharged and/or that its execution should not proceed because -of a lack of Inherent Jurisdiction. Since no grounds showing lack of inherent Jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller were shown or had existed, the Objections under this Section deserved to be dismissed. ' The Additional Rent Control Tribunal had also agreed with the reasoning of the Additional Rent Controller on the merits of the application. In the face of concurrent findings of fact it is not appropriate for this Court to exercise its extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 227 of ,the Constitution to upset these conclusions. However having already considered them in some detail it must be stated that the finding of the Courts below are correct.

(3.) Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Tenant has relied on the decision of the, Ho.n'ble Supreme Court in Molar Mal (Dead) through LRs Ltd..,..., 2000 4 SCC285. As argued before the Tribunal, heavy reliance is placed on the following sentence "Therefore, we have no hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the restriction contemplated under that proviso extends even up to the stage when the Court or the Tribunal is considering the case of the landlord for actual eviction and is not confined to the stage of the filing of the eviction petition only" Even while reading out this sentence learned counsel for the Petitioner had ''abruptly stopped after the words "for actual eviction" and had omitted to read remaining sentence which has been underlined by me. 'The answer is to . be found in the underlined portion. It must always be borne in mind that .expeditious hearing of eviction petitions is what is expected of Rent Controllers. To permit a fresh hearing or a second round of litigation after the passing of an eviction order would tantamount to defeating the intendment of the Act. This is specially so where the alleged facts could quite easily have been averred in the written Statement or the Leave to Contest, as the case may be , by a diligent tenant. Such a party cannot be allowed to emasculate the law by stretching and prolonging the proceedings inordinately; he must plead all relevant facts at the very first instance. It was further observed in Molar Mal's case (supra) that where a plea had been raised but had not been considered by the Courts, it could be raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The sentence relied upon by learned counsel for the Petitioner/Tenant occurs in these circumstances and should not be read outside the context of the facts which the Apex Court was considering. It must be interpreted in the syntax of its concluding part of the sentence which I have underscored above; It is not an authority for the proposition that fresh facts can be raised in execution proceedings by filing of filing of 'Objections what was in the contemplation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the consideration of issues' raised 'not necessarily at the stage of the filing of the eviction petition but at any time till the eviction order is passed. As I see it, if a choice is to be made between two, interpretations the one working towards an expeditious disposal of a lis ought to be preferred and no benefit should be granted to a non-diligent party that is interested in delaying its conclusion. The general approach till now has been that all events that have occurred after the filing of pleadings should be permitted. Even this principle has been watered and narrowed down in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastave (2001) 2 SCC 604. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that the bona fide requirement of the landlord on the date of his application for eviction should be alone considered. Subsequent developments during the pendency of the eviction petition occurring because of the slowness of the process of litigation should not be permitted to be misused by. sitting tenants. These observations would apply a fortiori to a' case where the tenant raises grounds only in its Objections, which it ought to have and could have, with reasonable investigation and diligence, pleaded in its written Statement or Leave to Contest. Such grounds should not be considered in execution proceedings. A contrary approach would have the effect of delaying a decision in the pending litigation inordinately, and would encourage and give a fillip to dilatory tactics.