JINDAL PHOTO FILMS LIMITED Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Doubting correctness of the view expressed by learned Single Judge in two decisions in Surrender Sethi v. State, 1997 (1) C.C. Cases 211 (HC) and Dutt Enterprises Ltd. v. State, 1996 IV AD (Deliti) 393, reference has been made by another learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. Dispute relates to the desirability of stipulating time limit for recording preliminary evidence in a case involving Section 138 of the Ne- gotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short 'the Act'). Hon'ble referring Judge felt that stipulation of time for recording of preliminary evidence, as was directed in those two cases, is clearly beyond the legislative prescription. The observations in the aforesaid two cases, which the Hon'ble referring Judge felt not to be in order, are as follows : In Surrender Sethi's case (supra) reference was made to Dutt Enterprises case (supra) and it was inter alia held as follows: "It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that by an order passed on 16/08/1996 this Court in Dutt Enterprises Limited v. State, 1996 IV AD (Delhi) 393 had given directions to the Metropolitan Magistrate to,ensure thatin cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, preliminary evidence should be recorded by them as early as possible on receipt of a complaint under the Act but in no case recording of such evidence shall be deferred beyond a period of two months from the date of receipt of the complaint by them." In Dutt Enterprises case (supra) it was observed as follows: "With a view to avoid giving long adjournments only for recording of preliminary evidence in cases which fall under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and with a view to dispose of these complaints without undue delay, the Metropolitan Magistrates must ensure that the preliminary evidence is recorded by them as early as possible on receipt of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but in no case record- ing of such evidence will be deferred beyond a period of two months from the date of receipt of the complaint by them."

(2.) We have heard learned counsel for petitioner and Mr.R.D. Jolly, who acted Amicus Curiae. Both of them submitted that the Act was introduced when it was felt expedient to define and amend the law relating to promissory note, bills of exchange and cheques. That being the position it was submitted that an early disposal of the dis- pute would be healthy, for the commercial world. But the moot question is whether any time limit could be fixed as directed by learned Single Judge.

(3.) The Act was enacted and Section 130 thereof incorporated with a view and specific object of making a special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. As was observed by the Apex Court in Mls. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. M/s. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. & Ors., JT 2001 (2) SC 1 the law relating to negotiable instrument is the law of commercial world legislated to facilitate the activities in trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity to the instruments of credit which would be deemed to be convertible into money and easily passable from one person to another. To achieve the objectives of the Act, the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it proper to make such provisions in the Act for conferring such privileges to the mercantile instruments contemplated under it and provide special penalties and procedure in case of the obligations under the instruments are not discharged. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, re- quired to be interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the general law and the procedure provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants. Efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are required to be discouraged lest it may effect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy of the country. Above being the object of the enact- ment, as rightly contended by learned counsel appearing in the case, an early disposal of the dispute would be appropriate. But fixing a time limit as done in the two cases may present practical difficulties and hurdles. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prescription about the time limit, the Court cannot suo moto prescribe a time limit. Nevertheless, while dealing with such disputes the concerned Judicial officers have to keep in view the legislative intent and take all possible steps to ensure ex- peditious disposal of the cases.