DELHI CANTONMENT BOARD Vs. DAULAT RAI AND SONS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is contended by counsel for the applicant/petitioner that under sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the period prescribed to file an application for setting aside the award is three months, the proviso gives power to the Court that in cases where the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making such application within the said period of three months, the court may entertain the application within a period of 30 days. It was contended that after the said period of one month has expired, Section 43 of the said Act provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitration as it applies to proceedings in Court and on that basis the delay in filing objections may be condoned. According to learned counsel for the applicant, the legislature by inserting Section 43 in the Act has applied the Limitation Act to the proceedings which are filed in this Court and, therefore, on the basis of sufficient cause shown, the Court is fully empowered to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The proposition enunciated by learned counsel for the applicant has been vehemently controverted by learned counsel for the respondent. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent has cited Pushpa P. Mulchandani & ors. Vs. Admiral Radhakrishin Tahilani (Retd.) & Ors. 2001 (2) Arb. LR 284.

(2.) I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. To my mind there is no force in the arguments of the applicant. Firstly Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is a complete code with regard to the scope, parameters and the grounds on the basis of which an application to challenge an award can be filed. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the said Act provides in no uncertain terms the period in which an application to challenge such award on the basis of what has been stated in sub-section (2) of Section 34 can be filed. The period is three months. There is no further time which can be taken by an applicant who wishes to challenge an award passed by an arbitrator if three months have expired. The legislature in its wisdom has incorporated a proviso in sub-section (3) of Section 34 to the effect that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, the Court may entertain such an application for objection against the award. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 is reproduced below:

(3.) However,-an embargo has been placed on the powers of the Court, i.e. the time of thirty days prescribed in the said proviso and the proviso makes it very clear in the last words "but not thereafter". If I agree with the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable in these proceedings, then the proviso shall become otiose. Secondly, what has been stated in Section 43 of the Act is not what learned counsel for the petitioner has canvassed before me. Section 43 deals with the arbitrations and the applicability of the Limitation Act to such arbitrations. Therefore, the words used in sub-section (1) of Section 43 are "The Limitation Act 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in court". It cannot be said that expression of extending the applicability of the Limitation Act to arbitrations makes it applicable to objection which an applicant has to maintain within the time prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 34. I do not see any merit in the contentions of learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner in view of the specific bar regarding the period of limitation prescribed in Section 34 of the Act. This Court has no jurisdiction to further condone the delay after the time prescribed has expired in terms of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act. Application is dismissed. OMP 267/2000.