SAT PERKASH ANAND Vs. D K PODDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Landlord applied for permission u/s 19(1) to sue petitioner for eviction pleading that a house built at Naraina by tenant in the name of his wife, was his and he was a man of means. Tenant denied this and also claimed that his tenancy was for residential-cum- Commercial.

(2.) By order dated 13.3.70 the permission sought for was granted. It was held by the competent authority that the premises in question had been taken by the petitioner for residential purposes and had been admitedly used by him as such. It was further held that the petitioner had taken another residence being House No. 8932, Shidipura Delhi and that if permission is granted he would not create another Slum. It was also found by the competent authority that the petitioner had got a house built in Naraina extension, Delhi and that he is a man of means and was in a position to acquire an alternative accommodation in case of his eviction.

(3.) The aforesaid order has been challenged in this petition under Article 2-26 of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the findings recorded by the competent authority are not correct. Mr. S.L. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner, has, however, not been able to show that the findings arrived at by the competent authority are either perverse or not based on any .evidence or for that matter even erroneous. The competent authority has taken all the evidence available on the record into consideration and has come to the conclusion that the petitioner is a man of means. The finding recorded by the competent authority that the petitioner has an 'alternative residential accommodation in which he is residing is a finding of fact which is in fact not disputed The case of the petitioner before the competent authority clearly was that he is no longer residing in the premises in dispute. If the premises in dispute were taken initially for residence and have subsequently been vacated by the petitioner then obviously the decision of the component authority to grant permission is correct. While granting permission what is relevant to be seen is the purpose for which the premises in dispute were let. In any event the other finding of fact of the competent authority, namely, that the petitioner is a man of means is also supported by evidence on record. Another house has been constructed at Naraina, Delhi though in name of the wife of the petitioner. The competent authority had observed that it had not been shown that the wife of the petitioner had any money of her own for the purpose of raising construction of the said house. It must obviously follow, therefore, that the said house at Naraina extension, in the absence of 'the wife being able to show the-source of money, must beheld to be that of the petitioner. The conclusion of the competent authority, therefore, that if eviction is ordered the petition will not create a Slum at any other place, appears to be correct.