RAM NARAIN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts leading to this revision petition succinctly are that on 19th of April, 1975, a report was lodged by one Partap Singh at Police Station Najafgarh complaining that the petitioner had broken open the locks of the main gate as well as store-cum-office of his factory which he was running as a partner under the name and style of M/s Dawar Engineering Works, on plot No. 38B, Khasra Number 100, at village Matiala, the said plot having been taken on rent by him from the petitioner on 12th of December, 1973 on monthly rent of Rs 125.00 . He explained that after taking the plot in question on rent he constructed the factory and installed the machinery therein at a huge expenses. Further according to him the petitioner was found sitting inside the office of the factory and on enquiry by him with regard to the breaking of locks of the factory premises he retorted that he had done every thing and that the complainant was at liberty to do anything. A case under Section 448/454/380 of the Indian Penal Code was registered on the strength of that report and eventually a charge-sheet was put in by the Police under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code for prosecuting the petitioner for offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Having regard to the allegations contained in charge-sheet, the petitioner was summoned by the Metropolitan Magistrate concerned. However, on putting in appearance, the petitioner raised an objection that charge-sheet having been filed much after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, the Court was not competent to take congnisance thereof. Another objection was that the offence was triable by the G am Panchayat under the provisions of Delhi Panchayat Raj Act and as such the Metropolitan Magistrate was not competent to try the same. However, both these contentions were repelled by the learned Metropolitan Migistrate vide his order dated 5th October, 1977 and notice under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was given by the Court to the petitioner as to why he should not be convicted of an offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code for committing tresspass in the premises of the aforesaid factory.

(2.) None turned up on behalf of the petitioner. Hence, I went through the record with the help of the counsel for the State. The first submission made by the petitioner in the revision petition is that the first information report in this case had been lodged on 19th April, 1975 but the charge sheet was filed on 23rd of December, 1976, much after the expiry of period of limitation as prescribed by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Further rejection by the learned Magistrate of his objection to that effect is not warranted by law.

(3.) Chapter XXXVI which is newly introduced chapter contains Sections 467 to 473- waich lay down bar of limitation and prescribe varying periods of limitation for launching criminal prosecution. Section 468 not only raises the bar of limitation but also prescribes the period thereof. It is not in controversy that the period of limitation in the present case would bs one year, as prescribed in clause (b) of sub-section (2) thereof. Section 469 lays down the terminus a quo for the period of limitation in various types of cases. Under clause (a) the period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence on the day of the offence. We are nit concerned with Cl. (b) and (e) thereof in the instant case. Thus computing the period of limitation from the date of the report in this case when the commission of the crime by the petitioner was detected, there can bs no doubt that ths complaint should -^ have been filed by or before 19th of April 1976. This there was a delay of about eight months in filing the charge-sheet on the part of the Investigating Agency.