JAGDISH PERSHAD Vs. PHOOLWATI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to the Division Bench is whether the Controller has power to extend the period of limitation of 15 days prescribed in the Third Schedule to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act), for obtaining leave to contest the application for eviction filed by the landlord against the tenant on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or under Section 14A thereof either by invoking Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 or otherwise. The respondent landlady filed a petition for eviction against the petitioner-tenant under clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Such an application is governed by the expeditious procedure laid down in. Section 25B of the Act. As required by Section 25B(4) the summons to the tenant was issued in the form Specified in the Third Schedule. The tenant was informed thereby that "You are hereby summoned to appear before the Controller within fifteen days of the service here of and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction on the ground aforesaid; in default whereof, the applicant will be entitled at any time after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for your eviction from the said premises." The tenant was served on 31-5-1977, but the application for leave to contest the eviction application was filed on 19-7-1977. The tenant sought the extension of the period of limitation of 15 days prescribed in the Third Schedule on the ground that he had gone to Dehra Dun in the third week of June 1977, to see his brother-in-law, where he fell ill and could not reach Delhi till the evening of 18-7-1977. A medical certificate, dated 17-7-1977 from a doctor of Dehra Dun was filed by the tenant staling that the tenant was under the treatment of that doctor since 27-6-1977 and was advised rest for three weeks. The Additional Controller held that he had no power to extend the period of limitation because the period prescribed by the Third Schedule gives a corresponding right to the landlady that if the tenant does not apply for leave to contest within fifteen days the landlord would have the right to evict the tenant. In a revision petition filed by the tenant before the learned Single Judge, a conflict of judicial authorities as to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act applied to the proceedings before the Controller and whether the Controller had any power to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Act either under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or otherwise was noted and the case was referred to the Division Bench.

(2.) Let us first consider if Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the application to be made to the Controller by the tenant under the Third Schedule. Section 29(2) is as below: "(2) Where any special or local Jaw prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act may be analysed as below: "(1) The Delhi Rent Control Act being a special or local law prescribes for an application for leave to defend a period of 15 days. (2) If the Limitation Act were to apply, then the period of limitation prescribed for an application not otherwise provided for is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act and is three years thereunder. The period of 15 days prescribed by the Third Schedule of the Delhi Rent Control Act can then be said to be different from the Limitation Act. (3) The question then arises whether the language of the Third Schedule read with that of Section 25B of the Delhi Rent 450 Control Act expressly excludes the operation of the Limitation Act to the application to be made under the Third Schedule."

(3.) The basic question is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act and in particular Section 29(2) thereof apply to applications made to a Tribunal or authority which is not a court. This question has been considered and decided by Supreme Court in a series of cases. In Town Municipal Council, Ashani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335) the view expressed was that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to an application which was made under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and secondly which was made to a court. In Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporatian of India, A. 1. R. 1970 SC 209, it was doubtful if the first requirement, namely, the application under the Code of Civil Procedure, was all necessary, but the second requirement was held to be necessary, namely, that an application must be to a court before the provisions of the Limitation Act could apply to it. In both these cases the question was whether applications filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were governed by the residuary limitation prescribed for an application by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is to be noted that the applications were not made to a court and, therefore, no provisions of the Limitation Act could apply to such an application at all including that of Article 137. The question of the construction of Section 29 (2) did not arise because of the non-fulfilment of the basic requirement, namely that unless an application is made to a court the Limitation Act is not attracted at all to it.