PANDIT CHANDER SAIN Vs. RANI VIDYAWANTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal raises the question whether in a Civil Suit a Civil Court can determine whether a party before it is a displaced person and whether he can take advantage of the provisions of section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the (Act') which came into force in Delhi as from December 10, 1951. The Commercial SubJudge, Delhi, who decided the suit filed by the appellant held that the predecessor-in-interest of the Defendant-respondents was a displaced person and they could take advantage of the provisions of the said section.

(2.) The appellant had advanced a loan of Rs. 15,000.00 to Raja Dhyan Singh of Sheikhupura at Lahore against a Promissory Note dated May 23, 1946 carrying interest at Re. 1.00 percent per month executed by him. The respondents are the legal representatives of the executant who died at Delhi on February 1, 1957. During his lifetime, he had paid, from time to tmie, an aggregate amount of Rs 3,000.00 to the appellant towards interest due upon the promissory note. After the death of the executant, the appellant filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 34,000.00 against the respondents. In this suit, he claimed a sum of Rs. 15,000.00 as principal and Rs. 22,163/13.00 as interest accrued from May 23, 1946 to September 16, 1958 and after giving credit for Rs. 3,000.00 paid by the executant towards interest and giving up a sum of Rs. 163/13.00 sued for Rs. 34,000.00.

(3.) The suit was contested by the respondents who denied the loan and the execution of the promissory note. They also denied the alleged part payments and acknowledgements and pleaded that the suit was barred by time. They also pleaded that the appellant had not notified his claim to the Court of Wards, Sheikhupura, within tile time prescribed by law and, therefore, the debt stood discharged. They further alleged that the debt in dispute was without legal necessity and was tainted with immorality. The last plea, which alone was argued in this appeal, was that the executant was a displaced person within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, no interest will accrue on the said loan on and from the 15th day of August, 1947, by virtue of section 29 of the Act. In answer to this last plea, the appellant contended that the Civil court would have no jurisdiction to entertain this plea as the determination of these questions was within the special and exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted under the Act,