HARI SHANKAR GUPTA Vs. MUSADDI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been filed by the tenant under section 39 of the Rent Control Act against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 4th January, 1969 by which he reversed the order of the Controller dated, 28-1-1968. February, 1968 and finally ordered the eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground that he had acquired vacant possession of another residence specified as a ground of eviction in clauses (h) of Proviso (1) section 14 of the Rent Control Act, 1958. The brief facts of the case are that the landlord was the owner of the premises bearing house No. 7295 constructed on plots Nos. 107, 108 and 109, Prem Nagar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi in which the appellant before me was a tenant and the landlord instituted a petition for eviction No. 104 of 1966, which has given rise to the present appeal on the grounds that the landlords needed the premises in dispute for his bonafide personal residence as well as that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of new premises in house No. 7289, Prem Nagar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi in the year 1956 being the grounds mentioned in sections 14(e) and 14(l) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The learned Controller, by his order, held that the ground of bonafide personal necessity had not been established and landlord had more than sufficient accommodation with him already and with regard to the second ground of eviction the Controller held that the tenant had never shifted to the new premises alleged to have been acquired by the tenant and he, therefore, repelled the contention of the landlord on both these grounds.

(2.) On appeal by the landlord the ground of eviction of bonafide personal necessity, was expressly given up and the same no longer survives for determination. With regard to the second ground of eviction mentioned in clause (h) of proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 the Rent Control Tribunal held that the new premises had been taken on rent by the tenant himself and the receipts of payment of rent had been issued in his name and so it must be held that he had acquired vacant possession of the same as residence. He, therefore, ordered eviction on the said ground. When the appeal came up for hearing before me, the learned counsel for the tenant moved C.M. No. 283-J of 1970 for urging additional grounds of appeals. By consent of parties, I order that the grounds mentioned as additional grounds Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 relating to clause (h) of the proviso are allowed to be added conditional on payment of Rs. 50/- as costs which have been paid and accepted by the counsel for the respondent, so far as additional grounds Nos. 5 and 6 relating to notice and waiver are concerned, the application for amendment is rejected. Amended memo of appeal has been filed in the Court and I have heard the appeal.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellant has urged before me that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal, the ground of eviction under clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (4) is not available to the landlord unless and until it is established that the tenanted premises were let out to the tenant by the landlord for residential purposes and that the other premises which the tenant has acquired are also residential premises. He has, further submitted that there is no clear finding of the Tribunal on the said point so far as thee eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (h) is concerned and he prays that either this Court should decide this question on re-appraisal of evidence or should remand it to the Rent Control Tribunal for re-decision. The learned counsel for the respondent contests the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and he has invited my attention to paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Tribunal and urges that there is a clear finding that the premises in dispute were let to the tenant for purely residential purposes and the said finding is binding on this Court and is enough to dispose of the appeal even after the amended grounds of appeal are taken into consideration and the judgment and order of the Tribunal ought to be affirmed.