CHUNI LAL Vs. UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have both concurred to find that the University of Delhi who is the respondent landlord in this appeal was entitled to evict the appellant tenant both under provisos (b), (d) and (h) to section 14(l) and clauses (b) and (d) of section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) as pleaded by the landlord, on the following grounds, namely:-

(2.) The challenge to these concurrent findings in this second appeal is restricted only to "some substantial question of law" under section 39(2) of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, advanced the following legal arguments against the correctness of these findings, namely :

(3.) 1. Sections 14 and 22 are both parts of the same Act and ordinarily it is not practice of the legislature to repeal one provisions of the Act by enacting a repealing provision in the same Act. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, stresses the words "notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or in any other law" used in section 22 and argues that these words are intended to ensure that section 22 overrides section 14 of the Act and, therefore, makes it inapplicable to the cases of those landlords who are entitled to evict their tenants under section 22. If section 22 had not been enacted at all, the definition of "landlord" in section 2(e) of the Act would have admittedly included jurists entities like a company, a body corporate, a local authority or a public institution and these landlords would have been able to apply for eviction of their tenants under section 14 like any other landlords who might be natural persons. How far is this situation changed by the enactment of section 22 ? The landlords who happen to be a company, a body corporate or a public institution still continue to be covered by the definition of "landlord" in section 2(e) of the Act. Therefore, all the provisions of the Act concerning with the landlords are applicable to them. Why is it then that the legislature thought it necessary to provide that the provisions of section 22 would apply "notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or in any other law" 9 The reason seems to be plain enough. The principle part of section 14(l) absolutely prohibits the passing of an order or decree for recovery of possession by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant. The various grounds available to a landlord for the eviction of a tenant are then enumerated as provisos to section 14(l). Reading section 14 as a whole, the result is that a tenant can be evicted by a landlord only if one or more of the several provisos to section 14 (1) is satisfied and not otherwise. Therefore, while enacting section 22, the legislature was conscious of the fact that it had already laid down an absolute rule in section 14 prohibiting eviction of tenants except on the ground enumerated in the proviso to section 14(l). A landlord applying for eviction of a tenant under section 22 could, therefore, have been met with either or both of the following defences, namely :