PREM SHEEL MALHAN Vs. CHAND KUMARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The tenancy in this case was created in favour of the respondent on 1st Jay. 1964. The appellantlandlord on 7th February, 1966 filed application for the respondent's eviction under clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958, herein called 'the Act', on the ground of nonpayment of rent inspita of notics. On 30th April 1966, i.e. within two years from the date on which the premises were let out to her, the respondent-tenant filed ber written st-ltement, wherein she answered parawise all the a.legations of the aypellant-landlord as contained in his petition for eviction. The Respondent 1n her said written statement also disputed toe correctness of Rs 2751- as the rate of monthly rent. She pleaded that the monthly rent in any case, was highly excessive and exorbitant and alleged that to the best of her knowledge the standard rent had already been fixed in respect of the premises in dispute at Ks. 57 per month, If any standard rent had not been fixed, she prayed that the standard rent of the suit premises be now fixed. The appellant-landlord filed an application before the Additional Controller praying that the tenant could not be heard on her plea for fixation of standard rent, and, therefore, no evidence be recorded in the said rent proceedings. The Additional Controller dismissed the said application and held that the written statement filed on behalf of the respondenttenant could be regarded as an application tor fixation of standard rent and as the same was filed within two years from the date of the tenancy there was no bar to entertain the said application The learned Rent Control tribunal in appeal, concurred with the view of the Additional Controller and dismissed the appeal in limine. The landlord has come up in second appeal to this Court. On behalf of the landlord, it was contended that (a) the prayer made in the written statement for fixation of standard rent cannot be treated as an application for fixation of standard rent, and (b) that the Respondent 1s not entitled to make any application for fixation of standard rent as her tenancy has been teiminated by service of a legal and valid notice. She merely enjoyed protection from eviction till the final decision of the ejectment application. She has no right to pray for fixation of standard rent.

(2.) On the first contention, it is true that the standard rent cannot be fixed under section 15(3) of the Act. The standard rent has to be fixed, if at all, under section 9 read with section 12 of the Act. But, there is no bar to the Controller treating the written statement as an application for the purpose of fixation of standard rent (sea para 15) of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M N. Chawla v. J, S. Sethi. The objection of the appellant to the effect that the application for fixation of standard rent has to be in the prescribed form is without any substance as apart from the observation of the Supreme Court in Chawla's case (Supra) the prescribed from for an application praying for fixation of standard rent is the same as that for eviction. The written statement in the present case is a detailed reply of the respondent, para by para, to the particulars of the application of the appellant for eviction. The written statement therefore, contains complete particulars which are required to be give in an application, prescribed under the Rules, for the determination of standard rent. In any case, as held by the Supreme Court ill Chawla's case (supra), it is for the Controller to treat the said written statement as an application for fixation of standard rent and as the Controller in this case has treated that written statement as an application for the purpose of fixing standard rent, there is no scope left for further objections. It may be noticed that the written statement having been filed within two years from the date on which the premises were let to the respondant-tenant. the question of bar of limitation prescribed under section 12 of the Act does not arise. The application therefore, was competent

(3.) The second contention of the landlord has no basis. The expression 'tenant has been defined in the Act by section 2(1) as meaning any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises Is, or but for a spacial contract would be, payable and includes a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy but does not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. In this case no order or decree for eviction has so far been made. The respondent, therefore, continues to be a tenant for the purpose of this Act even if her tenancy has been terminated by in ans of a valid notice, as she still continues to be in possession. Section 9, which deals with the power of the Controller to fix standard rent speaks of an application made to him in this behalf either by the lanlord or by the tenant; and the Respondent 1s a tenant as defined in the Act. The application by her is, therefore, maintainable and the written statement when treated as an application for that purpose, as has been done in this case, is a proper application by the tenant and the Controller is well within his jurisdiction to entertain the same.