ROHIT SHEKHAR Vs. NARAYAN DUTT TIWARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Appeal assails the Order dated 3.11.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge by means of which an application filed by Defendant No.1 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for short) came to be allowed. The learned Single Judge has held the Suit not to be maintainable at Delhi and secondly that it was liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. By pronouncing on both pleas, with respect to the learned Single Judge, an anomalous situation has been brought into effect. Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC postulates circumstances in which a plaint can be rejected. Objections pertaining to territorial jurisdiction filed under the preceding Rule, that is, Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC requires the return of the plaint for the purpose of it being presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. Rule 10(a) of Order VII of the CPC has been inserted into the CPC with effect from 1.2.1977 and endeavours to comprehensively cover cases where the plaint is returned to enable the Plaintiff to file it in the court which properly possesses jurisdiction to entertain and decide the disputes between the parties. If the learned Single Judge was convinced that the Delhi High Court or any other Court in Delhi does not possess territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis, he was bound to return the Plaint. The learned Single Judge, by traversing into the second issue of limitation, has rendered the issue of territoriality otiose since the Plaint has been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the ground that its consideration was barred on the ground of limitation. In our view, only one of the two courses ought to have been chartered. If the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that he ought not to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that courts in Delhi were not appropriately possessed of jurisdiction, he should have returned the Plaint and gone no further. In such an event, if the Plaintiff had chosen not to challenge the Order, it would have been open for him to file the Plaint in Andhra Pradesh or anywhere else, according to his understanding. It would have been the province of any of these Courts to decide whether the Suit is barred by limitation. Alternatively, if the learned Single Judge was convinced that the Suit could not be entertained or tried because this exercise was barred by the statute of repose, this finding could only have been given only if in his opinion he possessed territorial jurisdiction. In the event, the learned Single Judge has held that the Courts in Delhi are bereft of jurisdiction. Therefore, he could do more than return the Plaint.

(2.) The Respondent/Defendant No.1 has not assailed the impugned Order. The inference that must be drawn is that he supports the finding and conclusion that the High Court of Delhi does not possess territorial jurisdiction, in which case the conclusion on limitation is devoid of jurisdiction. As we see it, confusion has been confounded by entertaining both Objections simultaneously which, in the circumstances obtaining before us, are mutually incompatible. Do Courts In Delhi Possess Territorial Jurisdiction

(3.) We must first deal with the question of territorial jurisdiction and only if we conclude that Delhi holds jural sway over the disputes articulated in the Plaint will we venture towards the second. Discipline requires us to do so since the conclusion on this point will determine whether we should travel to the second aspect of the Appeal. In our opinion, the Courts in Delhi, and the High Court of Delhi in particular, possess territorial jurisdiction to receive, entertain, try and thereafter decide the Suit. The provisions of the law to be adverted to are in the fasciculus comprising Sections 15 to 25 of Part-I of the CPC dealing with the "place of suing". We shall briefly mention Section 16 of the CPC, which deals with suits concerning immovable property, for the reason that Mr. Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel for Defendant No.1, has endeavoured to impart a new and restricted interpretation to Section 20 of the CPC. It is prescribed by the CPC that where suits pertain to immovable property, the Courts within whose ordinary jurisdiction such property is situate would possess jurisdiction. There is one exception which is frequently in debate, which we may say remains inconclusive, which is that a relief pertaining to immovable property can be fully executed through the personal obedience of any person, the place where such person actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, can exercise territorial jurisdiction. Drawing on this exception, Mr. Nayyar contends that since the Prayers in the Plaint essentially require compliance by Defendant No.1, the Court ought not to travel beyond Section 20(a) of the CPC, and jurisdiction should be restricted to that Court where Defendant No.1 actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. This argument, which indeed is ingenious, seeks to annihilate the contention of Mr.P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, that even if Clause 20(a) of the CPC is attracted, since the cause of action has, wholly or in part, arisen in Delhi, the Plaint must be held to have been properly instituted in the High Court of Delhi on the strength of Section 20(c) of the CPC. We are unable to be persuaded by Mr. Nayyar because, facially, each of the three sub-clauses in Section 20 of the CPC are separated with the conjunction 'or', denoting thereby that each of them operate independently.