LAWS(DLH)-2000-7-114

RAM TYAGI Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Decided On July 28, 2000
RAMA TYAGI Appellant
V/S
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present writ petition is preferred by the petitioner seeking for quashing of the order dated 5.9.1995 issued by the respondent, remov- ing her from service, in exercise of the powers conferred by Regulation 19(1) of the D.D.A. (Salaries, Allowances & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1961 (herein- after in short called the 'Regulations'). The aforesaid order of termination is challenged on the ground that no fair opportunity was given to the petitioner before removing her from service and, therefore, there is violation of the principles of natural justice.

(2.) It transpires from the records that a criminal case was instituted against the petitioner and her sons Shri Sanjay Tyagi and Shri Bipin Tyagi under Sections 498(a)/304(B)/34, Indian Penal Code vide F.I.R. No. 234/1991 in Police Station Keshavpuram, Delhi. In connection with the aforesaid criminal case the petitioner was arrested on 30.11.1991. After conclusion of the trial, the petitioner and her elder son, namely/ Shri Sanjay Tyagi were convicted by the Trial Court on 13.2.1995. The respondent in view of the aforesaid order of conviction passed against the petitioner removed her from service by the impugned order dated 5.9.1995. As against the aforesaid order of removal, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Ex. Governor who dismissed the said appeal by order dated 29.5.1997. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court preferred an appeal which is pending disposal in this Court registered as Criminal Appeal No. 39/1995.

(3.) Counsel for the petitioner submitted before me that the aforesaid order of removal dated 5.9.1995 is bad, illegal and void ab initio being in violation of the principles of natural justice. She also submitted that the said order was passed by an office having no jurisdiction to pass such an order being subordinate to the Appointing Authority. She further submitted that the Appointing Authority cannot delegate his power of dismissal or removal to a Subordinate Authority which would be in violation of the constitutional provision and that the issue as to who is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner is to be determined at the point of time of appointment and not at the time of passing the impugned order of removal.