INDERJEET SINGH Vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision is directed against the order dated 27.9.1996 passed by the Special Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No. CC-63/94 tendering pardon to the accomplice V. Bhaskaran.

(2.) Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the petitioner joined the Indian Administrative Services in July 1969. It is alleged that during the period from 1st July, 1969 to 28th March, 1987, the petitioner illegally acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. As per the prosecution case, the accomplice V, Bhaskaran abetted the petitioner in committing the offence, which is punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Resultantly the FIR RC-1/1987-ACU-1/CBI/SIC-1, New Delhi dated 24.3.1987 was registered by the CBI. Investigation pursuant thereto culminated insubmission of a charge sheet against the petitioner and the accomplice V. Bhaskaran. During the trial the accomplice V. Bhaskaran filed an application before the Special Judge for grant of pardon. Notice of the said application was given to the petitioner as well as the CBI. The CBI did not oppose the application but the petitioner opposed it. By the impugned order, the Special Judge tendered a pardon to the accomplice V. Bhaskaran, the said order was communicated to the accomplice V. Bhaskaran and he accepted the tender of pardon. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has come up in revision before this Court.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the validity of the impugned order on the ground that it was necessary for the learned additional Sessions Judge to have the statement of the accomplice recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code . before tendering pardon to him. He further contended that the Additional Sessions Judge has not assigned sufficient reasons for the said tender of pardon. Sub-Section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 empowers a Special Judge to tender pardon to an accomplice. In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel does not hold much water. In Fakir Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1938 P.C. 266, it was held that failure of the Magistrate to record his reasons for the tender of pardon does not invalidate the tender. That apart, either sub-Section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act nor the provisions of Section 306 or 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplate the recording of the accomplice's evidence before tendering a pardon, except on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances and within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. This does not, I think, mean that the Special Judge may not ascertain what an accomplice, to whom a pardon is to be tendered, is likely to say in evidence. The Special Judge may have, for instance, a statement made to the police, he may have a statement that may have been recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code . It is also relevant to mention that the basis of granting pardon is not the extent of the complicity of the person to whom pardon is tendered. The principle behind this is to prevent the escape of the offender from punishment and all that sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act under which pardon is tendered requires that pardon may be tendered to any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned or privy to the offence. The satisfaction under sub-Section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is of the Special Judge. The question whether on the materials before him, he should tender a pardon or not is, therefore, his discretion, which, no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognized rules of law in that behalf. This Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of materials which has satisfied the Special Judge. In this case, the learned Special Judge had before him an application made by the accomplice V.Bhaskaran himself that a pardon might be tendered to him on the condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence in question. Reference may in this context be made to the following statement made by the accomplice in his application filed before the learned Special Judge.