UNION BANK OF INDIA Vs. KRISHAN KUMAR SUREKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A jural nodus has cropped up in this litigation. A plaint had initially been filed in this Court for Specific Performance and Damages. Since the jurisdictional value of the dispute was approximately Rs. 36 lakhs, the case was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal in 1995. Proceedings continued in the said Tribunal and the parties submitted to its jurisdiction. Issues were struck by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. It appears that an objection had been raised pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that it had no power to try the suit for Specific Performance of the contract. Eventually on 18.5.1998 the appellant / plaintiff-Bank stated that it did not press the relief for Specific Performance, since such relief was not available under The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The relief for the passing of a decree of Rs. 36,20,722.92, as originally prayed in the plaint was, however, retained. Despite this statement, by its order dated 20.7.1998 the Debt Recovery Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit since it contained the relief of Specific Performance. It accordingly transferred the suit to this Court.

(2.) Mr. A.K. Matta, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-Bank has reasserted before me that since the prayer of specific performance had been given up, the pending proceedings were for the recovery of a debt due to the Bank and could, therefore, be tried only by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. In support of his contention he relied on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in United Bank of India v. Debts Recovery Tribunal and Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 69=m (1999)SLT 482=1 (2000) BC 662 (SC).

(3.) Mr. G.L. Rawal, learned Counsel for the defendant, however, contended that this argument could not be entertained or considered by the Court since the order transferring the proceedings from the Tribunal to the High Court was passed on 20.7.1998 and was amenable to correction by the filing of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal as envisaged in Section 20 of the Act. The stipulated period of limitation being forty five days, which has expired, the order dated 20.7.1998 has obtained finality. He has relied on a decision of this Court in Shoes East Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank II (1998)BC 250,in which my learned brother M.S.A.Siddiqui, J.had dismissed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution by holding that the Act provides an adequate and efficacious remedy of appeal, and that Article 227 of the Constitution was not intended to supercede the statutory modes of reliefs. I am in respectful agreement with this decision. It, however, does not apply to the contentions and the vexed question which exists in these proceedings.