LAWS(DLH)-2000-1-49

INSP BAL KRISHAN Vs. STATE OF DELHI

Decided On January 19, 2000
BAL KRISHAN Appellant
V/S
STATE OF DELHI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeks quashing of the charge framed by a Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 325/34 Indian Penal Code on 6th October, 1998 against the petitioner and setting aside of the order dated 23rd April, 1999 passed by an Addl. Sessions Judge dismissing the revision petition filed against the said charge by the petitioner.

(2.) In regard to the occurrence dated 10th October, 1992 Dhir Singh made a complaint to Commissioner of Police on 16th October, 1992 and on failure of the police to register FIR, Crl.W.No. 624/92 was filed by him. This writ petition came to be disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 13th May, 1994 with the direction to the police authorities to register an FIR on the basis of complaint which was the subject matter of the petition and to investigate it as per law. Investigation was, however, ordered to be carried out by the Crime Branch instead of local police. As is manifest from the said order, the allegations made in writ petition in short were that on 10th October, 1992 at about 11.00 PM petitioner alongwith Constable Sunder Lal Parashar came to the house of aforesaid Dhir Singh and started beating his family members; that petitioner pushed Manoj Kumar, son of Dhir Singh from the roof of the house resulting in compound fracture in his left leg. However, in the reply affidavit the stand taken by the petitioner and others was that on 10th October, 1992 at about 10.40 PM, the police received information that criminal Mahinder Fauzi might be available in the house of said Dhir Singh and, therefore, a raid was conducted. After seeking the police, Manoj Kumar Jumped from the roof and received injuries on his leg. FIR No. 499/92 under Section 309 Indian Penal Code was registered on 11th October, 1992 against Manoj Kumar at P.S. Bhajanpura. Thereafter, another FIR being No. 17/93 under Section 309 Indian Penal Code was registered at PS Seelampur as the place of occurrence fell within the jurisdiction of that police station. After completion of investigation, charge sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed against said Manoj Kumar before the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate. Indisputably, pursuant to the said order dated 13th May, 1994 FIR No. 319/94 under Sections 452/325/506/34 Indian Penal Code was registered at PS Seelampur and after completing investigation, charge sheet was filed on 2nd December, 1996 against the petitioner and Sunder Lal Parashar. Impugned charge under Section 325/34 Indian Penal Code was framed on 6th October, 1998 against both of them and the criminal revision preferred by the petitioner filed against the framing of the charge under the said head came to be dismissed by an Addl. Sessions Judge by the aforementioned order dated 23rd April, 1999.

(3.) Submission advanced by Sh.K.B. Andley appearing for the petitioner was that the prosecution of the petitioner is barred by limitation under Section 140 Delhi Police Act, 1978, not having been instituted within three months from the date of the alleged occurrence dated 10th October, 1992. According to him, prosecution is also barred under Section 197 Cr.P.C. for want of sanction from the competent authority. He invited my attention to the Notification No. 10/77/78-H.P.II dated 7th April, 1980 issued by Delhi Administration in terms whereof protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been extended to the serving police officials of all ranks in Delhi Police force charged with the maintenance of public order. On the contrary, it was argued by Sh.S.B. Jaisinghani, Add. Solicitor General appearing pursuant to the order dated 12th July, 1999 that the petitioner cannot reasonably claim that the act of pushing by him of Manoj Kumar from the roof which resulted in fracture in his left leg, was done under colour of his duty or in excess of duty imposed or authority conferred on him either under the Delhi Police Act or any other law or by any rule and, therefore, none of the said two sections has any applicability to the facts of the present case.