MAHABIR SINGH Vs. AIR INDIA LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Rule. The petitioner was engaged as a contract labourer to perform the work of Security Guard Sometime in July, 1996 and he has been working with the Respondents ever since then. Pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 645 : 1997 (9) SCC 377 : 1997-I-LLJ-l 113 the respondents decided to screen the contract labour for the purposes of regularising them. The case of the petitioner was also screened and it was found that he did not meet the medical standards inasmuch as he was short by 3 cm. Accordingly, it was decided to terminate his services. This led to the petitioner filing the present writ petition. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the respondents are under an obligation to regularise the services of the petitioner irrespective of whether the Petitioner meets the medical standards or not. I am afraid it is not possible for me to agree with this contention. The petitioner must meet all the requirements of the respondents before he can be regularised. This will be in consonance with the rules and regulations of the respondents. If the rules and regulations are not applied then it will amount to discrimination because the rules cannot be waived insofar as the petitioner alone is concerned.

(2.) . It is then contended that under the Standing Orders of the respondents, the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 can waive the medical requirements. This is strongly refuted by learned counsel for the respondents who submits that the Managing Director cannot waive the requirements except for exceptional reasons. Paragraph 33 of the Standing Orders on which reliance is placed by learned counsel for the Petitioner reads as follows:

(3.) . It appears to me that, as stated by the Respondents in their counter affidavit dated 14/10/1999, paragraph 33 of the Standing Order is, really speaking, a pre-employment medical examination. It therefore, operates only at the stage of recruitment. What happens in a case where a person is already employed or deemed to have been employed or is actually physically working with the Respondents would not be covered by paragraph 33 of the Standing Order. In the case of the petitioner, he is actually physically working for the Respondents, though through a contractor. His case will, therefore, have to be treated on a different footing. To my mind, in a situation such as the present, which is different to what has been postulated in Paragraph 33 of the Standing Order, a meaningful interpretation will have to be given with regard to the medical examination, but it cannot be radically different from the essence of Paragraph 33 of the Standing Order. I am of the view that in the case of the Petitioner, the Managing Director will have to satisfy himself that the disability in the case of the petitioner is such that it is likely to affect the occupational suitability of the workman. If the Managing Director is satisfied that the disability of the petitioner will affect his occupational suitability, he is at liberty to refuse to regularise him but if he is satisfied that it will not affect his occupational suitability, the Managing Director should give him the benefit of regularisation considering the fact that he has been working with the Respondents since 1996.