DEEN DAYAL SHARMA Vs. UPKAR CHIBBAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Boundaries between nations have two prominent characteristics' they change from time to time and most often cause friction and fighting between the neighbours. This is also true of those between States within a nation, and as the present case manifests, even between inhabitants of adjoining colonies located in the same metropolis. The Plaintiffs, the alleged owners of 325 and 326, Village Masjid Moth, New Delhi, have filed this suit for a declaration that the land over which ownership is claimed by the Defendant is a service lane on the back side of N.D.S.E. Part-ll, New Delhi, and that the land is a "public utility service". The Plaintiff has further prayed for an injunction restraining the Defendant from raising any unauthorised construction on this land. On 6/6/1997, the Defendant was restrained from raising any unauthorised structure without having any sanctioned plan.

(2.) This application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 shall now be disposed off. Arguments were addressed before me at great length on a number of days. In order to succeed in sustaining the injunction, the Plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case, must disclose that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of the injunction and must also convince the Court that irreparable loss will visit them if the protection is denied to them. In my opinion they have failed to do so.

(3.) The Plaintiffs have filed a Site Plan of the area, regretfully replete with incorrect and/or false data. Firstly, in paragraph 4 of the Plaint there is a statement that there is a 30 feet wide-road 30 feet whereas in the Plan it has been shown as 75 feet. I am in no doubt that this is not an innocent mistake, but calculated to mislead the Court in believing that wide road existed at the site. Secondly, Plo No. A-63 is shown as adjoining, side-by-side, the Defendant's plot A-64 sharing a long common boundary, whereas both are corner plots. In fact, these plots face each other and have a short common boundary in front on the Plaintiffs property. This error is also palpably intended to mislead the Court as Plots A-63 and A-64 have an area much larger than other plots, since both appear to have been originally allotted extra land at both ends, being at the end of the street. This fact is sought to be diluted by giving the impression that all the plots in the entire row have to same area. Thirdly, the Plan is deliberately not to scale, quite obviously to cause the illusion that the Defendant has a small plot when compared with the Road. As already mentioned, the 30 feet road has been shown a 75 feet. The Court would naturally be alarmed in these circumstances and carry a bias against the Defendant for attempting to encroach upon a large portion of public land. This dishonesty is evident when the Plan is compared with a Plan (Annexure D E) of the same area filed in Civil Suit 690/1986 on 6/12/1986 by other Plaintiffs namely Ramesh Kumar (House N6.328) and Om Prakash (House No.'327) in the Court of Shail Jain, Civil Judge. It is true that the Plaintiffs are not the same, but they are immediate neighbours of each other, fighting the same cause against the same adversary. I cannot believe that they are ignorant of their respective litigations with the same Defendant. The Plan filed in the earlier suit sounds the death-knell of the Plaintiffs case as it clearly shows that the garage of Plot 63A existed across the 30 feet road. It also shows that there was some construction in respect of the Defendant's land. It further shows that this road is a blind alley. Significantly, in paragraph 7 of the plaint it has been averred that the road is a "dead-end". These material misrepresentations are sufficient by themselves to disentitle the Plaintiffs to any equitable relief.