J N TEXTILES Vs. BON CHANCE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are Objections filed by the Respondent/Objector for the setting aside ofthe Award dated 9.3.1995 published by Shri Mahender Pal Goel, Sole Arbitrator.The Objector has contended that there was no Arbitration Agreement subsistingbetween the parties. The clause relied upon by the Petitioner can be found printed onits Bills. It states that "any dispute regarding this bill shall be referred to the Arbitrationof Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association or their appointed Judge Tribunal and thedecision shall be binding upon both parties". The Respondent/Objector has furthercontended that the Award deserves to be set aside since it emanates from aunilateral Reference, since the Respondent/Objector had not consented to theArbitration. Both these points are no longer res Integra. Three Learned SingleJudges have come to the same opinion on this subject; it is well-settled, !n TikkanlalSewaram Vs. Jiwandas Desraj, 1980 Rajdhani Law Reporter 681, S.B. Wad, J.had held that where the arbitration clause is contained on the bills of sale theReference to Arbitration, of Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association or its nomineeas in the present case, was proper. The learned Judge has relied on the decision ofthe Division Bench of this Cousin P.C.Agarwal Vs. K.N. Khosla, ILR 1975 Delhi 64. A similar arguments were raised in the case titled as M/s. Luda Ram Ved Prakash Vs. M/s. Maharani of India, AIR 1989 Delhi 169. The learned Judges held as follows:

(2.) Yet an another decision of a learned Single Judge on this very point is to befound in Madan Mohan Rajgarhia Vs. M/s. Mahendra R. Shah & Anr., 1995 (32)DRJ 517, Usha Mehra, J. held that the arbitration clause printed on the bill would beapplicable even to a non-member. She had relied on the precedents reported as M/s. Krishan Chander Ramesh Chander and Bros. Vs. Sohan Lal, AIR 1982 Delhi122 as well as Banwari Lal Kotiya Vs. P.C. Aggarwal, AIR 1985 SC 1003. Thelearned Judge observed as follows:

(3.) The third contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent/objector is thatthe Reference was premature. The argument is that Respond that in the legal noticedated 8.11.1994 issued, on behalf of Petitioner by its Advocate, the RespondentObjector had been called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 11,63,175,80 within fifteen days ofthe receipt of its notice, it has been strenuously argued that this notice was receivedon 28.11.1994. These oral arguments are contrary to the pleadings before meinasmuch as in para D of the application it has been averred that the legal noticedated 8.11.1994 was served on 20.11.1994. The argument of the learned counsel forthe Respondent/Objector proceeds that time for payment would have run out only on13.12.1994 and hence the commencement of arbitration prior to this date would bepremature. There is no substance in this argument for the reason that the periodpostulated by the legal notice expired on 5.12.1994. Even if the appropriate date was13.12.1994, there is no statutory or legal stipulation that arbitration proceedingscannot be commenced. This argument have been appreciated if some payment hadbeen tendered on or before 13.12.1994. This is not the case.