SUBHASH SHARMA Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAIPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner would call in question the legality and validity of the notice issued to him under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the IT Act'). Petitioner wold also pray for declaring the search of his premises as illegal and void ab initio and for return of money, bullions or other valuable items seized from his premises.

(2.) Challenge is thrown on the ground that there is no basis of issuance of search warrant under Section 132 of the IT Act because 'reason to believe' does not exist for issuance of the search warrant. It is also argued that there was no information in possession of the authorising officer forming the basis for the reason to believe and further that the warrant of authorisation is in the name of Amolak Singh Bhatia and Others and not against the petitioner. It is also argued that issuance of notice under Section 153A of the IT Act to a person against whom search is initiated under Section 132 of the IT Act will arise when the search is legal, but the same not being the case here, Section 153A of the IT Act has no application. Petitioner has referred to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others v Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver and Others, 1967 66 ITR 664 and Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Pune and Others v Spacewood Furnishers Private Limited and Others, 2015 12 SCC 179 : [2015] 374 ITR 595 (SC).

(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Revenue, per contra, would also refer to Spacewood Furnishers Private Limited (supra) to argue that the search warrant issued against the petitioner under Section 132 of the IT Act was based on material forming the foundation to provide lawful reason to believe, therefore, notice under Section 153A of the IT Act is in accordance with law and there can be no judicial review of the sufficiency of the material forming the reason to believe. It is also argued that the information were germane to the subject in hand, therefore, no interference is called for in this petition.