(1.) With the consent of parties, the matter is heard finally since pure question of law is involved.
(2.) The petitioner is owner of vehicle bearing registration No.CG- 04/HB-3999. That vehicle was seized under the provisions of Section 47-A of the Chhattisgarh Excise Act, 1915 (for short, 'the Act of 1915') on 3-8-2016 on the allegation that the petitioner was found unauthorizedly carrying liquor and ultimately, in a proceeding initiated under Section 47-A of the Act of 1915, the vehicle was directed to be confiscated by the Collector on 24-8-2017 and the appeal preferred before the Excise Commissioner under Section 47-B of the Act of 1915 was also dismissed on 16-5-2018 against which the petitioner sought to prefer a revision before the Court of Sessions under Section 47-C of the Act of 1915 on 26-3-2019 with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on the ground that against the order of the appellate authority, he preferred a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before this Court which was eventually dismissed as not maintainable on 8-2-2019, but that revision was dismissed by the learned 2nd Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur holding that in Section 47-C of the Act of 1915, no power to condone the delay has been conferred by the Legislature while enacting Section 47-C, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to revision(s). Feeling aggrieved against that order, this petition under Section 482 of the CrPC has been preferred.
(3.) Mr. Akhilesh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the Additional Sessions Judge is absolutely unjustified in rejecting the application holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to revisions, as the power of revision has been conferred expressly under Section 47-C of the Act of 1915 against the order of the appellate authority passed under Section 47-B(3) of the Act of 1915 within 30 days of such order which provides revision against the order of the appellate authority and as such, power to condone the delay in preferring revision has not been expressly excluded, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.