LAWS(CHH)-2009-10-35

GEETA UPADHYAY Vs. SURENDRA KUMAR

Decided On October 23, 2009
GEETA UPADHYAY Appellant
V/S
SURENDRA KUMAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WITH the consent of the parties the matter is heard finally.

(2.) THE Applicant has preferred this revision petition against the judgment dated 22.4.2002 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir, in Criminal Appeal No. 213/2000 reversing the judgment of Conviction passed by the trial Court on 4.12.2000 passed in Criminal Case No. 404/2000. THE trial Court by its judgment had convicted the accused/Respondent No. 1 herein for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 509 and 506-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month with fine of Rs. 300 Under Section 341, simple imprisonment for three months with fine of Rs. 500 Under Section 509 and rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs. 1000 Under Section 506-B of the Indian Penal Code. THE lower Appellate Court however reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court, acquitted him of all the offences levelled against him.

(3.) ON the other hand counsel for non Applicant No. 1 supporting the impugned judgment submits that while deciding the appeal the lower appellate Court was fully empowered to re-appreciate the evidence available on record as the scope under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide enough to do so. He drew the attention of this Court to paragraphs 9,10 and 15 to 17 of the impugned judgment where teamed lower appellate Court has threadbare considered the entire evidence and dealt with all the points considered by the trial Court. According to him the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court are not perverse and therefore the same cannot be interfered with in this revision. In support of his argument he placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex court in the matter of Bheru Lal and Ors. v. State of Rajsthan AIR 2009 SCW 5142 and that in the matter of State of M.P. v. Munshi Singh and Ors. AIR 2009 SCW 5508 and submits that the order of acquittal can be interfered with only when it suffers from perversity and that the appellate Court's power being of wider ramification, very much permit for re-appreciation of the evidence.