NANHKU Vs. RAMCHARAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The substantial question of law involved, formulated and to be answered in the defendant's second appeal is as under: - "Whether the finding of the First Appellate Court regarding applicability of Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is perverse?"

(2.) The respondents/plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaration of title and possession stating inter alia that the property stated in Schedule-1 of the plaint is self-acquired property of the father of plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and husband of plaintiff No.3 Late Manchar, S/o Aitwa Uraon, granted in ryoti right by Surguja Settlement, which was given on license to the father of defendant No.1 for agriculture work to maintain his family. Thereafter, father of defendant No.1 died and defendant No.1 also requested for continuance of license which was permitted and the said land would be returned as and when it is required, but thereafter, defendant No.1 got his name entered in the revenue records leading to filing of instant suit in which the defendants were proceeded ex parte. The plaintiffs examined three witnesses namely, Bhangli (PW-1), Phulbasiya (PW-2) and Ramcharan (PW-3) in support of their case. Defendant No.1 denied the plaint allegation and setup the plea of adverse possession in his favour.

(3.) The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence on record though came to the conclusion that it is self-acquired property of Late Manchar, S/o Aitwa Uraon, and succeeded by the plaintiffs, but further held the plaintiffs have failed to prove grant of license in favour of the father of defendant No.1, and dismissed the suit. In appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, the first appellate Court affirmed the title of the plaintiffs over the suit land, but held that the license can be oral and applying Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'the TP Act') held that in agricultural license, the provisions of Section 117 are not applicable. Questioning the judgment & decree of the first appellate Court, second appeal has been preferred by defendant No.1 in which the substantial question of law has been framed which has been set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment.