UTTAMCHAND JAIN Vs. MOHNIBAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) INVOKING the revisional jurisdiction under Section 23-E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), the applicants herein have called in question the propriety of the order dated 11-04-2001 passed by the R.C.A., Rajnandgaon (hereinafter referred to as the R.C.A.) in case No. 3-A/1990 whereby the application under Section 23-A of the Act for eviction of the non-applicants-tenants on the grounds of bonafide requirement for non-residential purpose, was rejected.

(2.) THE facts as unfolded by the record are that one Anopi Bai filed an application for eviction of the tenant under Section 23-A of the Act before the R.C.A. on the ground that the accommodation let out for non-residential purpose was required bonafide for starting her own business and she had no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation in town in her occupation. During the pendency of the application before the R.C.A. an application for amendment was filed on 06-08-1996 whereby the bonafide requirement of Prakash Chand Jain S/o Anopi Bai for starting his business was also incorporated in the application under Section 23-A of the Act. Anopi Bai died on 20-10-1998 during the pendency of the proceedings before the R.C.A.

(3.) SHRI H.S. Patel, learned Counsel for the applicants has assailed the impugned order on the ground that unless a specific order was passed by the R.C.A. granting leave to the tenant to contest the application filed under Sub-section (2) of Section 23-B of the Act, the written statement and the evidence led by the tenant could not be looked into and the R.C.A. ought to have straightaway passed an order of eviction of the tenant. It was also urged by the learned Counsel for the applicants that the Court should adopt a liberal and not a highly technical approach while appreciating the evidence led by the landlord. It was also contended that mere fact that at one point of time the landlord wanted to sell the demised premises would not by itself be sufficient to discard the evidence relating to a bonafide requirement for starting business at a subsequent point of time. Reliance was placed on Rajkumar Katalia v. Smt. Ramwati Bai 1994 (1) MPWN 146, Ranjit Naravan Haksar v. Surendra Verma 1999 (11) MPACJ 424, Smt. Tahera Bi. v. Smt. Mehmooda Khanam 2000 (1) MPACJ 316, M.P. Dongre v. Smt. Kusumlata Shukla 2002 (11) MPACJ 140, Naravan v. Hasraj Jahan Begum 2002 (11) MPACJ 242, SHRI Rama Sahu v. Smt. Ashawanti 2001 (11) MPACJ 166, Ajay Silewar v. Smt. Premwati Parimal 2000 (11) MPACJ 45, Komalchand v. Kewalchana 1995 MPACJ 65, Dhannalal v. Kalawati Bai and Ors. : (2002) 6 SCC 16, Jhamubai v. Bhanwar lal 1998 MPACJ 445, Harbans Singh v. Smt. Marqrat G. Bhanqardive : AIR 1990 MP 191, Girish Chandra Chaturvedi v. Smt. Pushpa Bhopatkar and Ors. 1997 MPACJ 476, Hemant Kumar v. Shankar lal and Ors. : 1997 (2) MPLJ 671. Learned Counsel for the applicants read the evidence on record in extenso in order to show that the finding recorded by the learned R.C.A. that the accommodation in question was not required bonafide by Prakash Chand for starting his business is perverse.