CHIEF MEDICAL AND HEALTH OFFICER Vs. SHYAM BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order shall dispose of M.(C.)P. No. 1421/2004 which is an application for condonation of delay in filing this Misc. Appeal, filed under Order 43, Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The aforesaid appeal has been filed against the order dated 7.2.2004 passed by the IVth Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raigarh in Misc. Claim Case No. 1/2003. By the said order, the Claims Tribunal has dismissed an application filed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex-parte award dated 29.11.2002. The appeal is barred by 136 days of limitation. The brief facts are that the Claim Case No. 73/2002 was fixed for evidence on 9.10.2002 before the Claims Tribunal. On the said date, the Appellants herein, who were the non-Applicants before the Claims Tribunal, remained absent and the Tribunal proceeded ex-parte against them. Ultimately, after expediting the hearing, after almost about 1 month of the said date, an ex-parte award to the tune of Rs. 4,12,000/- was passed by the Tribunal on 29.11.2002. THIS was challenged by the Appellants before the Tribunal by filing on application under Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure and the said application was dismissed by the Tribunal on 7.2.2004. It is against the said dismissal, the Appellants have filed this Misc. Appeal which is barred by limitation of 136 days for which on application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed vide M.(C.)P. No. 1421/2004. Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the delay in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional but, due to time consumed in taking sanction to file the appeal from the Law Department, which was granted on 20.5.2004 and further, in appointment of Officer In-charge of the case and other ministerial works, the appeal could not be filed in time. He prays for condoning the delay of 136 days.

(2.) ON the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondents opposes the prayer. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of Misc. Appeal. So far as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, it has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of Ramlal and Ors. Appellants v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. : AIR 1962 SC 361, that in construing Section 5, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of Limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that Judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.

(3.) IT appears that such sanction etc. are the internal exercises of the Government and in doing such exercise, the authorities of the State have utilized more than sufficient period. The yardstick to test the sufficiency of cause for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of State Government or the Central Government is not different and where the Government is to file appeal or other proceedings, in which a period of limitation is prescribed, it is the duty of the Government and its officials to be more vigilant to make all the requisite exercises in time so that, the appeal or proceedings are preferred within the period of limitation, so prescribed by the law. If in doing so, prompt steps are taken and some delay appears on record due to unavoidable circumstances, then only it would amount to a "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal or the proceedings in time and an extension under Section 5 is possible. In this case, there is no reasonable explanation for the delay of 136 days as each day's delay has not been explained and the explanation offered by the State in 2 lines in vague and general manner is not acceptable. I do not find any merit in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the same is dismissed. In consequence, the appeal also stands dismissed.