SAIYAD SHOUKAT ALI Vs. TIJIA BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners have preferred this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by which they have challenged the order dated 1-7-2003 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Misc. Appeal No. 10/2003 affirming the order dated 2-5-2003 passed by the 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 91-A/2003. Facts leading to filing of this writ petition, in brief are that Smt. Tijia Bai and 4 others who are respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in this petition filed a civil suit along with an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC against the petitioners in the Court of 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II for permanent injunction in which the plaintiffs/respondents herein mentioned that on 18-4-2002 they purchased a piece of land ad measuring 0.16 acre, bearing Khasra No. 85/61 through registered sale deed from the legal heirs of Harilal and since purchase of land, they are in possession and their names have also been entered in the Revenue Record. The defendants in that suit/the petitioners herein have collected cement iron bricks and sand for construction on the land in question, whereas, in fact, the defendants' land falls in Khasra No. 75/71 which is not near to the land in question. The Khasra number of the land in question is 85. They have also reported the matter to the police.

(2.) THE undisputed facts are that Rampalat, Ram Mali and Horilal were three brothers and they were sons of Hardas Mourya and Hardas Mourya was the owner of the land of Khasra Nos. 75/85 and others. The land of Hardas was partitioned among three sons namely, Rampalat, Ram Mali and Horilal. Horilal and Rampalat after partition of land sold their shares of land to different persons at different times. The petitioner No. 1 herein/the defendant in the suit purchased piece of land from Rampalat ad measuring 0.131/2 (6050 sq. ft.), out of Khasra No. 75/01 by a registered sale-deed dated 25-1-96, the petitioner No. 2 again purchased a piece of land ad measuring 0.09 acre, i.e., 3800 sq. ft. adjacent to Khasra No. 75/01 through a registered sale deed dated 23-1-96. Thereafter in the year 2002 Smt Ramshila Devi the widow of Horilal, Pramod and Purshottam (his sons) and daughters Rukmani Devi, Rajkumari and Meenakumari daughters of deceased Horilal got recorded their names in the Revenue Record regarding the left out land of Horilal and they sold the land to respondents in this petition and the plaintiff in the main suit ad measuring 0.16 acre out of Khasra No. 85/02 through a registered sale deed dated 3-5-2002. A perusal of the order of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court reveals that the demarcation of the land which was sold by Rampalat to the petitioners herein in the year 1996 and the land sold by the heirs of Horilal to the respondent Nos. 1 and 5 is similar, i.e., boundaries shown in both the sale deeds are similar and that became the matter of dispute. The case of the respondents herein/plaintiff in the suit is that the disputed land falls into Khasra No. 85 and belongs to them which they have purchased whereas, the case of the petitioners herein is that Horilal in his life time sold all his lands to various persons leaving behind the only portion of land which was reserved for passage/road and that land was still standing in the name of Horilal and after the death of Horilal, the heirs of Horilal have sold that portion also.

(3.) BOTH the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court after hearing the parties and perusal of the sale deeds and other relevant documents reached to the conclusion that both the parties are claiming their title on the land in question and that too through a registered sale deed which requires a thorough scrutiny. After recording the evidence of the patties and in the circumstances the Trial Court said that prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiffs. The balance of convenience and irreparable loss also lies in favour of granting injunction and maintaining status quo on the spot and in appeal the learned 3rd Additional District Judge also affirmed the order. It is settled law that the Trial Court while considering the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 before granting temporary injunction should satisfy that prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff and balance of convenience and irreparable loss also lies in favour of the plaintiff, then and then only the injunction can be granted restraining the defendants and on appeal the Appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the order only when the Court reached to the conclusion that order granting temporary injunction is perverse, contrary to the facts or contrary to law. And in the ordinary course the Appellate Court is not required to interfere with the temporary injunction granted by the Trial Court in a routine manner because the Trial Court with whom the disputed matter is pending, after looking into the facts of the case and in order to maintain the status quo on the situation and also to ensure that during the pendency of the suit the situation should not be allowed to create which makes the filing of the suit meaningless and ultimately it becomes difficult for the Trial Court to grant final relief. So in one form the grant of temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit is to prevent the defendants not to create a situation which make the Trial Court difficult to grant the final relief. In this case the Appellate Court also examined the orders and documents of the Trial Court and reached to the conclusion that the order passed by the Trial Court granting temporary injunction do not violate in the settled principles of law and ultimately dismissed the same.