PIJUSH PIYUSH BABUN GUHA Vs. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE following order of the Court was passed by T.P. Sharma, J: - Applications under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short 'the Code?), I.A.No.1 filed on behalf of Vinayak (Binayak) Sen in Cr.A.No.20/2011 and I.A.No.1 filed on behalf of Pijush (Piyush) Guha @ Bubun Guha in Cr.A.No.54/2011 for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of appeal against the judgment of conviction & order of sentence dated 24 -12 -2010 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in Sessions Trial No.182/2007 are being disposed of by this common order.

(2.) APPELLANT in Cr.A.No.20/2011 Binayak Sen has been convicted for commission of the offence of sedition punishable under Section 124A of the IPC; Sections 8 (1), 8 (2), 8 (3) & 8 (5) of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 (for short 'the Act, 2005?); and Section 39 (2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short 'the Act, 1967?) and sentenced as under: - Conviction Sentence Sec.124A read with Imprisonment for life & fine of Sec. 120B of the Rs.5,000/ -, in default additional IPC RI for one year. Sec. 8 (1) of the RI for two years & fine of Act, 2005 Rs.1,000/ -, in default additional RI for three months. Sec. 8 (2) of the RI for one year & fine of Act, 2005 Rs.1,000/ -, in default additional RI for three months. Sec. 8 (3) of the RI for three years & fine Act, 2005 Rs.1,000/ -, in default additional RI for three months. Sec. 8 (5) of the RI for five years & fine of Act, 2005 Rs.1,000/ -, in default additional RI for three months. Sec. 39 (2) of the RI for five years & fine of Act, 1967 Rs.1,000/ -, in default additional RI for three months.

(3.) MR. Ram Jethmalani points out that while dealing with the question of ordinary bail and bail in the event of arrest, Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. The State of Punjab1 has specifically held that legislature itself has left discretion of the High Court unfettered relating to ordinary bail and has not attempted to lay down any particular rule which may bind the High Court for exercising its jurisdiction in grant or refusal of bail. The principles to be deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.