(1.) This appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiff-Society under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 27.07.2007 passed by Third Additional District Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No.24-A/2007, whereby the said Court has dismissed the claim for specific performance of contract. The parties to this appeal shall be referred hereinafter as per their description in the trial Court.
(2.) Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Plaintiff-Society, known as Vijay Grih Nirman Sahkari Samiti Maryadit registered under Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1960') having its registration No.mi ia-/R-109/84-85 instituted a suit through its President Tej Kumar Bajaj claiming specific performance of contract by submitting, inter alia, that an agreement to sale (Ex.P.1) was executed by Defendant Babulal on 16.04.2004 agreeing to alienate the property in question, i.e., part of Khasra No.175 admeasuring 0.33 acres of land situated at village Gogaon, Tehsil and District Raipur at the rate of Rs.3,50,000/- per acre upon receiving the earnest amount of Rs.500/- in its favour. According to the terms and conditions stipulated therein, a registered deed of sale was required to be executed within a period of one month from its release from the provisions prescribed under the Urban Land Ceiling Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as it was vested therein at the relevant time. According to the Plaintiff, despite the reversion of it in 2006 and in spite of issuance of notice dated 07.08.2006, the Defendant has failed to execute the same giving rise to the institution of the claim in the instant nature, instituted on 16.04.2007.
(3.) Despite service of summons of the suit, the Defendant has failed to appear and the trial Court after considering the statement of Tej Kumar Bajaj (PW1), observed that in absence of any authority letter, said Tej Kumar Bajaj cannot be held to be authorised to institute the suit. It held further that the sale deed was required to be executed within the stipulated period of one month upon the reversion of the land in question from the said Act, however, in absence of any order showing its reversion as such, the sale deed cannot be executed. It observed further while considering the receipts (Ex.P.4 to Ex.P.10) that some of them do not show that the part of sale consideration was received by Defendant Babulal. As a consequence, the trial Cort has dismissed the claim.