H S BASAVARAJAPPA Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE land is question had been granted in favour of respondent-3 in the year 1950-51. At that time it did bear Survey No. 150 measuring 4 acres situated at Banur Village. That the grantee by a registered sale deed dated 11. 11. 1969 made transfer of that land giving as Survey No. 158. In proceedings under Section 5 of Act no. 2 of 1979, the Assistant Commissioner, Tarikere Sub-Division, tarikere and the Deputy Commissioner, Chickmagalur District, chickmagalur held the sale of the granted land to be in violation of the terms of the grant and the Law then applicable which prohibits alienation of the granted land for all the times to come and so the authorities held the transfer to be null and void and directed resumption of the land from the purchaser and its restoration to the grantee. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Assistant commissioner, Tarikere Sub-Division, Tarikere, petitioner filed the appeal and the Deputy Commissioner, Chickmagalur District, chickmagalur passed the order dismissing the appeal, the purchaser has come up before this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the land purchased by the purchaser-petitioner was Survey No.-158 of Banur village, while the land that has been granted was Survey No. 150. So the land in question purchased by the petitioner has not been the granted land, nor the authorities have so found it. I have perused the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, tarikere Sub-Division, Tarikere. The said order indicates that Survey no. 150/51-52 was given as R. S. No. 158 after resurvey and this R. S. No. 158 was sold. Petitioner's Counsel urged that 3rd respondent had other 5 survey numbers and out of that R. S. No. 158 has been sold. No where before ihe authorities below it has been so assertese indicated that 3rd respondent was possessed various survey numbers, nor indication of those survey numbers have been given. The land was granted to the poor landless agricultural labourer belonging to the Scheduled Castes. So this contention does not appeal to be sound that the land was granted to the grantee, though she was possessed other plots as well. Apart from that no where before the Appellate Authority, the petitioner has asserted that Old survey No. 150/51-52 i. e. , Survey No. 150 was not given as R. S. No. 158 after resurvey. The Assistant Commissioner has clearly mentioned that Survey No. 150 was resurveyed as Survey No. 158. That finding having not been challenged, nor any challenge being made before the Appellate Authority in the course of the arguments. Hence this plea is not open to him. The learned Counsel contended that in view of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the application of the grantee was not maintainable after three years. That the authorities can suo motu initiate proceedings under Section 5 (1) of Act No. 2/1979, because Section 5 (1) provides that where on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo motu and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section{1) of Section 4 he may (a) by order resume take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed, provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard and (b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. The application even if it was belated, but the facts having been brought to the notice of the authority, it could suo motu take action, if some body was in possession of the granted land on the basis of transfer which is null and void and law mandates the Assistant Commissioner to order resumption of possession of the land by evicting such unauthorised person in possession of the land and further to restore the land to the grantee. So the duty had been cast on him on the facts were brought to him notice, even to take suo motu action as there and there was no bar to the exercise of the power by the Assistant commissioner. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel that the application was made beyond throe years has no substance, as in this case the authority could act suo motu the information received. The. application could be deemed to be the information. It is a well settled principle of law of interpretation that when expression used by Legislature are clear and unambiguous, then effect has to be given to intent expressed or revealed by the language and expressions used. No limitation is to be placed thereon when legislature has not chosen to control or to place any limitation where language used by legislature is capable of more than one interpretation and the interpretation, which is likely to frustrate the purpose of or of rendering the provision of law redundant such an interpretation should not be adopted instead the interpretation which is likely to subserve and fulfil the object is to be proferred. It is als6 well settled that it is not open to the Court while interpreting a provision to add or to subtract something from section or statute. It is also not open to Court to introduce a provision which legislature has not enacted or provided for. Keeping the above principles in view in my opinion it is always open to the Assistant Commissioner to take action under Section 5 of the Act, and discharge the mandatory obligation cast on it and Section 5, on relevant facts referred in the section coming to its notice from any source and necessary condition referred to in Section 5 (1) of the Act, being satisfied to order and direct as per Section 5 (1) (a) and 5 (1) (b) of the Act. Further provision of Section 29 (2)of Indian Limitation Act, provides and reads as under section 29 (2) Limitation Act -"where any special or local law prescnbes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation, different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determinating any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extend to which, they are not,expressly excluded by such special or local law. " a reading of this Section 29 (2) perse reveals as to what extent and in what circumstances and conditions provision of Limitation act will be applicable in matter of proceedings under Special or local law. This provision provides that Section 3 and Section 4 to 24 of limitation Act, by virtue of Section 29 (2) thus wilt apply. It prescribes two requirements namely:- (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under the special or local law for or in connection with the suit, appeal, or application; and (ii) The said prescription of period or provision should be different from the period prescribed by Schedule 10 Limitation Act, and fulfilment of above conditions or requiremenrs Section 29 (2) wilt automatically apply resulting in Sections 3 to 24 of Limitation Act, being applicable as well so far or to the extend to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. See PATEL navanthan vs DHULABHAI and MUKRI GOPALAN vs c. P. ABOOBACKER. Section 29 (2) does not make other provision of Limitation Act or its schedule applicable to proceedings under special or local law before any authority Judicial or Quasi-Judicial where under special or local law, the Legislature has not prescribed period of Limitation. The provision of neither Article 136 nor of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, have been made applicable. In the case of TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, ATHANI vs prescribed AUTHORITY-LABOUR COURT, it has been laid the article 137 may apply to application made before full fledged Civil court and it further laid it down that a Labour Court was not one of such Courts though established under special or local law and as such Article 137 will not apply to govern proceedings before it. This view has been laid down later on in NITYANAND M. JOSHI vs THE life INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA and KERALA electricity BOARD vs KUNHALIUMMA. The Assistant Commissioner is a revenue authority or quasi-judicial authority, but is neither a Civil Court nor Criminal Court. So article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act cannot be applied to govern or control proceedings under Section 5 of Karnataka Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain lands) Act. Thus considered the contention of Shri Rudragowda, based on Article 137 of Limitation Act, is without substance and as such is hereby rejected. The learned Counsel for the petitioner claimed title by adverse possession To claim adverse possession against the State the transferee had to prove his adverse possession against the State for 3c years from the date of purchase. Before the Act came into force 30 years period could not be completed. Secondly grantee's possession being permissive and under the umbrella of transfer from the grantee, who had not been granted ownership right, the- possession of the purchaser from the grantee will not become into adverse possession or hostile possession against State. No doubt if the transferee would have vacated the land and then reentered into possession of the land in hostility to State, independently of the grantee, he could have claimed title by adverse possession if he had established that he had been in possession for thirty years. So that claim fails as no such case has been taken. In this view of the matter, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit. The Writ Petition, as such, is hereby dismissed.