(1.) WE have heard this appeal at considerable length principally because the learned State Public Prosecutor submitted before us that the trial Court has totally and completely by-passed all those parts of the evidence which clearly indicates that there was a demand for money which was effectively the unpaid dowry amount and that this was the reason for the unhappiness that emanated in the mind of the deceased-wife. He has relied principally on the evidence of P. W. 3 in order to demonstrate to us that the reason for the unfortunate suicide was the continuous demand coupled with harassment that is traceable to the accused and that the learned trial Judge has not accorded due weight to this very important evidence. The learned State Public Prosecutor relies on the position in law because he submits that once the prosecution established that the aspect of dowry was very much in the forefront at the time of the marriage, that despite having demanded and received certain amount of money and other expensive, presents, that the accused-husband persisted in further demands, that he pressurised and ill-treated the wife with the object of seeing to it that the demands were met and that in view of this continuous pressure that the deceased ultimately put an end to her life. The overall contention was that all the ingredients necessary to establish the charge under S. 498-A and S. 304-B, IPC are present in this case and that the acquittal is totally unjustified.
(2.) WE need to record here that we have taken careful note of the legal submission canvassed and the proposition advanced both of which are upheld as there could be no two opinions about the fact that where there is basic evidence of the demand and receipt of dowry and where the evidence discloses that there were demands which continued after the marriage and allegation that ill-treatment of a serious nature was linked to this demand that not only would the offence under S. 498-A is established but that it would in most cases lead up to the more serious offence under S. 304-B, IPC. The Supreme Court has very clearly elucidated the inter-linking between these two offences but what we also need to take note of is that the very definition of S. 498-A, IPC and the case law clearly postulates that the evidence of cruelty is required to be established, cruelty of a grave level which is sufficient to seriously jeopardise the mental or physical will-being of the spouse. The law does not contemplate the usual day to day misunderstandings or quarrels or minor matrimonial problems which do not have this kind of after effects and it is this last aspect of the matter that has been upper most in our minds while evaluating the evidence before us.
(3.) WE agree with the learned State Public Prosecutor that there are over tones of subsequent demands and that there are some incidents such as leaving the girl at her parents' place and the like, which are relied on by the prosecution as incidents of cruelty of a serious nature. There is also a charge that the accused was friendly with one Meenakshi and that this is also one of the aspects of cruelty vis-a-vis the wife who had reacted seriously to this. That allegation is only in the form of a suggestion and Meenakshi, who was even cited as a witness was not examined. More importantly, what we find on a very minute evaluation of the record is that a review of the incident would undoubtedly disclose some level of unhappiness to the deceased, but in order to establish the criminal offence under either or bothof the charges the incidence, gravity and the volume of the cruelty would have to be much higher. All that we can hold is that this material comes dangerously close, but that in its totality, it is not good enough to sustain a conviction under either of the two charges.