STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. ERAPPA KURUGODEPPA PUJAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State of Karnataka has preferred this appeal which is directed against the decision in Sessions Case No. 74/1991 which emerges from the Court of the I Addl. Sessions Judge, Dharwad at Hubli. The six respondents-accused were charged with having committed offences punishable under Ss. 143, 147, 148, 324, 307 and 504 r/w. Section 149, IPC, and under S. 25 of the Arms Act. Briefly stated, it was alleged that on 3-8-1990 at about 1 p. m. an incident had taken place wherein A1 to 6 had collectively assaulted P. Ws. 3 to 7 as a result of which each of them sustained some injuries. A complaint was lodged with the Police on that evening and the six accused persons were arrested and ultimately charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences. At the conclusion of the trial, A1 to 6 were convicted of the offences punishable under Ss. 143, IPC and S. 323 r/w. Section 149, IPC, only, and they were acquitted of the other offences with which they were charged. The present appeal has been directed by the State against this decision both with regard to the adequacy of sentence as also with regard to the aspect of acquittal on the remaining charges.

(2.) AT the outset we need to point out that having heard the learned Addl. SPP. , and the Counsel who represents the respondents-accused as also having examined the record of this case, that we find no infirmity with regard to the order of acquittal as far as the remaining charges are concerned, as that part of the order is well founded. We therefore do not propose to disturb the aspect of the case.

(3.) THE learned SPP however drew our attention to the Probation of Offenders Act and he assailed the order of the trial Court whereby the accused have been given the benefit of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act whereunder they have been directed to execute a bond for maintaining good behaviour for a period of one year. It has been pointed out to us that this order was incorrect and furthermore, that there are certain legal requirements as also procedures that are required to be observed and that in totality of this situation, that the order giving the accused benefit of the Probation ofoffenders Act is liable to be set aside. On a clear construction of the law, the learned counsel who represents the respondents-accused has also had to concede that having regard to the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, that there does appear to be some error as far as this aspect of the trial Court's judgment is concerned. In the decision reported in (1971) 3 SCC 914, the Supreme Court while considering the ambit and scope of Ss. 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act has laid down that the procedure requires that the Court has to call for a report from the Probation Officer and on a consideration of the report and any other information available relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the Offender, the Court has to then decide as to whether or not the benefit of the provisions of this Act can be extended. When the plea was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, the Apex Court pointed out that in the absence of this procedure having been followed, that it is not open to the Court to extend any benefits to the accused under the provisions of that Act. In an other decision reported in AIR 1973 SC 2427 : (1973 Cri LJ 1614) the Supreme Court was considering the object and scope of Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act and has also held that as far as the serious offences are concerned which are punishable with imprisonment for life that the benefit of these sections is not available.