DEVATHA VENKATALAKSHMAMMA RATHNAM SETTY CHARITABLE TRUST BANGALORE Vs. COMMISSIONER CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, in this petition, claims to be a Charitable Trust established for the purpose of providing for literature, scientific education, providing facilities for poor students, destitutes and orphans, amongst other objects of general public utility. A copy of the Trust Deed has been produced as Annexure-A.

(2.) IN this petition, the petitioner has called in question the correctness of the order dated 18th of february, 1998, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-L, passed by the second respondent refusing to grant exemption from payment of property tax under Section 110 (b) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), and also the demand notice dated 2nd of January 1999, a copy of which has been produced as annexure-M.

(3.) SRI Srinivas, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is a charitable Trust and in terms of Section 110 (b) of the Act, the petitioner is exempted from payment of property tax in respect of the buildings owned by it. He pointed out that though, on some occasions, the petitioner collects rents for the buildings in question, the rent so charged is exclusively used by the petitioner-Institution for charitable purposes. Therefore, he submits that the petitioner is not liable to pay property tax in respect of the buildings in question. Secondly, he submitted that the impugned order Annexure-L came to be passed without hearing the petitioner and without giving an opportunity to the petitioner. Elaborating this submission, he pointed out that though the petitioner furnished the necessary details and claimed exemption, the impugned order came to be passed without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. It is his submission that as the order impugned seriously affected the rights of the petitioner and imposes a liability on the petitioner to pay huge tax, the second respondent ought to have given a personal hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. Thirdly, he submitted that the impugned order is also liable to be quashed on the ground that it is not a speaking order. He pointed out that from the order impugned, it is clear that there is absolutely no application of mind with regard to the claim made by the petitioner that it is entitled for the exemption from payment of property tax on the ground that the entire rent collected by the petitioner for occupation of the buildings by others, is exclusively used for charitable purposes.