V N MUNEGOWDA Vs. MUSHRAFF ALI BAIG

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THOUGH this revision has been listed in the matter of dispensation of notice being served on respondent Nos. 1 and 2, but the question does not arise as the revision, prima facie, appears to be not maintainable in view of the decision of this court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thibbegowda, 2000 ACJ 438 (Karnataka), whereunder this court, after having examined in detail, has arrived at a conclusion that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot be held to be civil court for the purpose of section 115 of Civil Procedure code. This view of this court has been taken after taking into consideration the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as well as sections 175 and 173 (2) of the motor Vehicles Act as well as provisions relating to the constitution of the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal which provide that a Tribunal may be constituted of a person who is or has been a Judge of the high Court or who is or who has been a judge of the District Court or who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of High court or District Court. So merely because it is headed by or presided by a Civil judge or District Judge, that will not make it a civil court because if I apply this principle otherwise for in this case Tribunal is headed by a sitting or retired High Court judge, question will arise whether it should be taken as a High Court? I answer certainly not, and such a question had been considered by their Lordships of the Apex court in the context of section 7 of Andhra pradesh Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 1982 in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Mohan Lai, 1998 (5) SCC 468, where a special court was constituted under that Act and which Act provided that it shall consist of a Judge of the High Court, sitting or retired as its Chairman and two district Judges and two revenue officers. Their Lordships observed even though it is termed as special court, it will not form part of judicature or civil judicature. It held it to be a Tribunal and remedy against the order thereof will be petition under article 226/227 of the Constitution. 1a. Further section 169 of the Motor vehicles Act reveals that legislature while enacting Motor Vehicles Act did not intend or conceive it to be a civil court. It has referred to the Tribunal as the Claims Tribunal and then it provides by virtue of subsection (2) that the Claims Tribunal shall have powers of a civil court under Code to take record of evidence on oath as well as to enforce attendance of witnesses. It reveals that the legislature maintained a distinction between the Tribunal and civil court, and legislature specifically enacted the provision in the Act and in absence of provisions of sub-section (2) of section 169 of the Act, it could not exercise those powers of civil court to take evidence on oath or enforce attendance of witnesses, etc. So by sub-section (2) such powers are conferred on the Claims Tribunal which powers are ordinarily vested in the civil court for taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects. The later part of sub-section (2) of section 169 further reveals that the legislature for certain special and specific purposes indicated, has incorporated legal fiction of 'the deeming clause' and it has provided that for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court. It is one of the well settled principles of law that when effect of deeming clause of legal fiction has to be considered, the court has to take into consideration the purposes for which the legal fiction has been created and legal fiction is to be given effect for only that or those purposes and not beyond that. It means it is deemed to be a civil court only for limited purposes of section 195 and chapter XXVI of Code of Criminal Procedure.

(2.) THUS considered in my opinion, the tribunal cannot be deemed to be or considered to be civil court for the purposes of sections 3,9 and 115 of Civil Procedure code. Under Civil Procedure Code, revision lies from a court subordinate to High court and what courts are subordinate to high Court has been defined under section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code itself. It may be said that if some law provides that a particular Tribunal or court is to be deemed as civil court for all purposes including section 115, position may be different. Here, it is not such. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal not being a civil court, the present revision is not maintainable and misconceived. It has to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed as not maintainable. As the revision petition itself is dismissed, there is no question of dispensation of notice to respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The said application is also rejected. Petition dismissed.