G L JAGDISH Vs. SHAMANTHA KUMARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these two writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have sought for quashing the ex-parte orders of interim maintenance passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore. The petitioners have not yet filed their objections and sought for re-consideration of the ex parte orders of interim maintenance granted in the petitions for maintenance filed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(2.) The contention of the petitioners is that neither Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.) contains any provision enabling the Court to pass an ex parte order of interim maintenance nor there is any other provision in the Criminal Procedure Code to reconsider the order of maintenance once passed whether interim or final; that the jurisdiction exercised by the Family Court is the one exercisable by the Court of Judicial Magistrate I Class under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code; therefore, the restrictions and the limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court continue to govern the Family Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned ex parte orders of interim maintenance are without jurisdiction.

(3.) On the contrary, it is contended by Sri Subbanna, learned High Court Government Advocate that the Court that has exercised the jurisdiction is a Civil Court. The fact that there is no provision contained in Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code enabling a Criminal Court to pass an ex parte order of interim maintenance does not take away the jurisdiction vested in a Civil Court to pass ex parte orders in aid of the main relief sought in the petition. It is also further submitted by the learned Government Advocate that the matter is no more resintegra because the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 984), has specifically considered this question and has held that the Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code has an inherent power to pass an ex parte order awarding interim maintenance and so also the Family Court which exercises the very same jurisdiction under Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Court Act. 1984, has jurisdiction to pass an ex parte order granting interim maintenance.