K SURESH NAYAK Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In writ petition nos. 21018 and 21019 of 1986 the petitioners, who are surgeons in the department of health and family welfare of the state government have questioned the constitutional validity of the Karnataka medical department service (recruitment) (Amendment) rules, 1986, and in writ petition nos. 21492 and 21493 of 1986, the petitioners, who are second division clerks in the revenue department of the state government, have questioned the constitutional validity of the Karnataka revenue subordinate branch services (recruitment) rules, 1977, contending that the Rules are void on the ground of being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India,

(2.) These matters have been referred to the division bench under section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. The important question which arises for consideration in these cases is: whether on the coming into force of the administrative tribunals Act, 1985 ('the act' for short) and the establishment of the stale administrative tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the constitution of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that Art. before it, challenging the constitutional validity of any law regulating recruitment and conditions of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the stale and decide such petitions stood excluded and got vested in the state administrative tribunal

(3.) The facts and circumstances of the cases which have given rise to the above question are these : the administrative tribunals Act, 1985 (act no. 13 of 1985) was enacted by the parliament pursuant to the power given to it under Art. 323-a of the constitution, which was incorporated in to the constitution by the constitution 42nd Amendment act. Under the said Act, Karnataka administrative tribunal was constituted with effect from 6-10-1986. Sec. 15 of the act specifies the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the slate administrative tribunal. According to the said provision jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to recruitment to any civil service of the state or to any civil post under the stale and All service matters concerning the civil servants of the state, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, except to the extent excepted by the provisions of the act. Services which are excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal are the officers and servants of the High Court and the sub-ordinate courts including the members of the sub-ordinate judiciary and the officers and officials of the state legislature. Sec. 28 of the act excludes the jurisdiction of All the courts, i. e. , including the high courts except that of the supreme court, in respect of matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal. It is having regard to the provisions of this Act, the question arises as to whether the jurisdiction to decide these writ petitions in which constitutional validity of service laws have been challenged, also falls within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal and consequently the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the constitution stands ousted or whether such matters cannot and have not been excluded from the jurisdiction of this court and therefore this court continues to have the jurisdiction. This very question, except that it concerned the central administrative tribunal, was considered by this court in the case of s. m. pattanaik v secretary to government of India, reported in ilr1986 Kar. 3954. That decision was rendered on 5-11-1986. In the said case, both the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as also the learned advocate- general appearing for the state submitted that the question should be answered in the negative. No specific stand in writing was taken by the central government. The question was considered in great detail and from various angles and was answered in the negative. The judgment was based upon the scope of Art. 323-a of the constitution which gave the power to the parliament to establish administrative tribunals. The relevant portion of the judgment reads :"5. (1) before considering the contentions urged by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Articles 323-a and 323-b of the constitution, which were introduced into the constitution by section 46 of the constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, as also to set out the salient aspects of the act. The two Articles read: administrative tribunals; 323-a (1) parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of any state or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the government. (2) a law made under clause (1) may (a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the union and a separate administrative tribunal for each state or for two or more states; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and Rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of All courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1) ; (e) provide for the transfer of each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment; (f) repeal or amend any order made by the president under clause (3) of Art. 371-d; (g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as parliament may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of such tribunals. (3) the provisions of this Art. shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. Tribunals for other matters : 323-b (1) the appropriate legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudicalion or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to All or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. (2) the matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely, (a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax; (b) foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers; (c) industrial and labour disputes; (d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in Art. 31-a or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or by way of ceiling on agricultural land or in any other way ; (e) ceiling on urban property; (f) election to either house of parliament or the house or either house of the legislature of a state, but excluding the matters referred to in Art. 329 and Art. 329-a; (g) production, procurement, supply and distribution of food stuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as the president may, by public notification, declare to be essential goods for the purpose of this Art. and control of prices of such goods; (h) offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (g) and fees in respect of any of those matters; (i) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (h). (3) a law made under clause (1) may, (a) provide for the establishment of hierarchy of tribunals; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals ; (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and Rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of All courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136, with respect to All or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals; (e) provide for the transfer to each such tribunal of any cases pending before any court or any other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment; (f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as the appropriate legislature may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals. (4) the provisions of this Articles shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provisions of this constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. Explanation. In this article, 'appropriate legislature', in relation to any matter means parliament or, as the case may be, a state legislature competent to make laws with respect to such matter in accordance with the provisions of part xi. Art. 323-a provides for the constitution of administrative tribunals for adjudicating disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants of the union as well as of the states. Clause 2 (d) of the article, provides that the parliament may by such law exclude the jurisdiction of All courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the constitution with respect to the disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1). Clause (3) provides that the Art. would have effect notwithstanding any other provision in the constitution. Art. 323-b provides for constitution of tribunals in respect of various matters specified in clause (2) thereof. The said clause also provides that the constitution of each of the tribunals contemplated by the Art. is for adjudication of disputes, complaints or offences with respect to All or any of the matters specified in clause (2). Clause 3 (d) of Art. 323-b provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of All courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 with respect to All or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunals so constituted. Clause (4) is similar to clause (3) of Art. 323-a and gives overriding effect to the article. (2) it is pursuant to the power conferred on the parliament under Art. 323-a, the act has been enacted. ""section 14 of the Act, which confers jurisdiction, powers and authority on the central administrative tribunal reads : '14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the central administrative tribunal. (1) save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the central administrative tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, All the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by All courts (except the supreme court) in relation to, (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India service or to any civil service of the union or a civil post under the union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian; (b) all service matters concerning : (i) a member of any All India service; or (ii) a person not being a member of an All India service or person referred to in clause fc) appointed to any civil service of the union or any civil post under the union ; or (iii) a civilian not being a member of an all-india service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the union or of any state or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the government; (c) All service matters pertaining 10 service in connection with the affairs of the union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) or clause (b) , being a person whose services have been placed by a state government or any local or other authority or any corporation or society or other body, at the disposal of the central government for such appointment. (emphasis supplied) section 15 of the act is similarly worded and specifies powers and authority of slate administrative tribunals in relation to service matters and recruitment to state civil services and posts. ""section 28 of the act provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of All courts except the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the constitution and section 29 provides for transfer of All pending cases before any court which falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal under section 28 of the act. ""6. It is common ground that the answer to the question which arises for consideration in this case, depends upon the true meaning of the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Art. 323-a of the constitution, for the reason that it is pursuant to the said Art. the parliament has enacted the Act, providing for the establishment of administrative tribunals for the purpose of adjudication of disputes and complaints relating to recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants as clearly indicated in the preamble. Therefore, the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the tribunal must necessarily fall within the scope and ambit of Art. 323-a of the constitution. In other words, the ambit of the expression 'service matters' defined in section 2 (r) of the act and of the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the tribunal under section 14 or 15 of the act and of exclusion of jurisdiction of other courts provided for under sections 28 and 29 of the act must also be ascertained only having due regard to the meaning of the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Articles 323-a of the constitution. It is also pertinent to note that the provision for exclusion of jurisdiction under clause (d) is expressly stated to be only with respect to the disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1). ""12. The submissions made by the learned advocate-general and the other learned counsel, raise several other important issues as are discernible from the submissions. The most important among them are: (1) whether the High Court could exercise power of superintendence over the administrative tribunal under Art. 227 in view of the ratio, in the case of jugal kishore as the said power is not excluded by any of the clauses in Art. 323-aas has been done under clause (7) of Art. 371-d; (2) whether the administrative tribunal or its bench is bound by the law declared by the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction it functions, in view of the ratio in the case of east India commercial company; and (3) whether section 46 of the constitution 42nd Amendment act by which Articles 323-a and 323-b were inserted into the constitution is itself invalid on the ground that it affected the basic structure of the constitution in view of the ratio in the case of keshavanand bharati. As these questions do not directly arise for consideration in this case, it is unnecessary for me to consider them. Therefore, I confine, the consideration to the question set out in the first paragraph. 13. The answer to the said question depends upon the true scope and ambit of Art. 323-a, sections 14, 28 and 29 of the act. Before undertaking the interpretation of these provisions, it is necessary in the first instance to set out the basic principles of interpretation. ""5. In the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v dikshitutu, which decision is the most apposite to this case, the question for consideration was whether the officers and servants of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and of subordinate courts in that state falling under the exclusive control of the Chief Justice and the High Court under Articles 229 and 235 of the constitution respectively fell within the expression of 'civil servants' and therefore came within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the andhra administrative tribunal constituted under Art. 371-d of the constitution to decide disputes relating to their conditions of service raised by them. The Supreme Court laid down the principles of interpretation applicable to such a case and interpreted the expression 'civil servants' as not including the officers and servants of the High Court and the members of judicial service and officers and servants of the subordinate courts and consequently jurisdictional bar for the High Court of Andhra Pradesh enacted in the Art. must also be held to be restricted. Relevant part of the judgment reads : '63. The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed 'according to the intent of they that made it' (coke). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised Rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation. 64. Where two alternative constructions are possible, the court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion, or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment. These cannons of construction apply to the interpretation of our constitution with greater force, because the constitution is a living, integrated organism, having a soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of the basic framework can be felt All over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture, nor a mere exercise in grammar. As one of us (chandrachud, j. , as he then was) put it in keshavananda bhati's case, AIR 1973 SC 1461, while interpreting words in a solemn document like the constitution, one must look at them not in a school-masterly fashion, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer, but with the realisation that they occur in 'a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other' so that the construction must hold a balance between All its parts. 62. The phrase 'civil service of the stale' remains more or less an amorphous expression as it has not been defined anywhere in the constitution. Contrasted with it, the expressions 'judicial service of the state' and 'district judge' have been specifically defined in Art. 236, and thus given a distinctive, definite meaning by the constitution makers. Construed loosely, in its widest general sense, this elastic phrase can be stretched to include the 'officers and servants of the high court' as well as members of the subordinate judiciary. Understood in its strict narrow sense, in harmony with the basic constitutional scheme embodied in chapters v and vi, part vi and centralised in Articles 229 and 235 there- of the phrase will not take in High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary. 76. . . ARTICLE 371-d as its heading itself proclaims which derogates from the general scheme of the constitution for a specific purpose, general undefined phrases are not to be interpreted in their widest amplitude but strictly attuned to the context and purpose of the provisions. Conversely, had it been the intention of parliament to include 'officers and servants of the high court' and members of the 'judicial service of the state' and of the cadre of 'district judges' in the phrase 'civil services of the state' occurring in clause (3) of Art. 371-d, and thereby depart from the basic scheme of chapters iv and vi, part vi, the language commonly employed in sub- clauses should have read like this : 'class or classes of posts in the civil services of the state including posts in the 'judicial service of the state' and of 'district judges' in the state; class or classes of posts of 'officers and servants of the high court'. 77. In our opinion, non-use of the phrases 'judicial service of the state' and 'district judges' (which have been specifically defined in Art. 236) and officers and servants of the high court' which has been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229, respectively, to differentiate them in the scheme of the constitution from the other civil services of the state, gives a clear indication that post held by the High Court staff or by the subordinate judiciary were advisedly excluded from the purview of clauses (3) of Art. 371-d. The scope of the non-obstante provision in sub-article (10) which gives an overriding effect to this Art. is co-ter-minous with the ambit of the preceding clauses. 78. The 'officers and servants of the high court' and the members of the judicial service, including district judges, being outside the purview of clause (3) , the non-obstante provision in clause (10) cannot operate to take away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or of the high court, as the case may be, under Articles 229, 235 and 226 of the constitution in regard to these public servants in matters or disputes falling within the scope of the said articles. Clause (10) will prevail over any provisions of the constitution, other than those which are outside the ambit of Art. 371-d, such as Articles 229 and 235. Provisions not otherwise covered by Art. 371-d, cannot be brought within its sweep because of the non-obstante clause (10). It follows as a necessary corollary that nothing in the order of the president constituting the administrative tribunal, confers jurisdiction on the tribunal to entertain, deal with or decide the representation by a member of the staff of the High Court or of the subordinate judiciary. "14. Bearing in mind the above principles, we have got to construe the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Art. 323-a of the constitution. Under the said article, the parliament is given the power to establish administrative tribunals for deciding disputes and complaints in respect of recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants. Clause 2 (d) of the Art. enables the parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of All courts except the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the constitution with respect to the above matters. The words 'disputes and complaints' have not been defined either in the constitution or in the act. The words 'service matter is defined vide section 2 (r) of the Act, which indicates that every type of dispute or complaint which a civil servant might raise, relying on the law regulating any of his conditions of service or recruitment, would be a service matter and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Neither Art. 323-a nor section 2 (r) , which defines 'service matter' nor section 14, 28 or 29 provide that disputes and complaints which could be raised before the tribunal would include questions relating to the constitutional validity of the law regulating the conditions of survice and recruitment of civil servants. A jurisdiction of that magnitude has to be conferred and cannot be inferred. Therefore, the very absence of a provision in Art. 323-a of the constitution which enables the parliament to confer on an administrative tribunal the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the laws constitutes a strong ground to say that judicial review of legislation, which is expressly conferred on the courts established by the constitution itself, namely, the high courts and the supreme court, which was exclusive before the insertion of Art. 323-a continues to be exclusive even after its insertion. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of dikshitulu, if the parliament intended to include officers and servants of High Court and the subordinate courts and members of judicial service in theexpression 'civil servants' the parliament would have expressly stated so. Similarly in this case if the parliament intended that the administrative tribunal to be constituted under a law enacted by the legislature, should be invested with the jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity of the laws regulating the conditions of service, it would have used the words 'including questions relating to the constitutional validity of laws regulating recruitment and conditions of service' after the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Art. 323-a of the constitution, particularly when the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of All laws was vested in the High Court by virtue of Articles 226 and 228 and continued to be vested in the High Court by Art. 228-a, introduced by section 42 of the 42nd Amendment itself. The very fact that such words are not included in Art. 323-a (1) after the words 'disputes and complaints' takes the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the laws outside the purview of clause (1) and consequently outside the purview of the administrative tribunal constituted pursuant to a law made pursuant to the power given under the Art. and therefore the exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Court which could be provided for in view of clause (d) and the overriding effect given to Art. 323-a by clause (3) thereof, would not operate in respect of the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide constitutional validity of any law regulating recruitment and conditions of service. further, a careful analysis of some of the new articles, which affected the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts and also imposed conditions on the exercise of their jurisdiction and powers, which were inserted into the constitution by the constitution 42nd Amendment Act, which brought about far reaching changes in the structure of the constitution by which Art. 323-a was also inserted into the constitution, would also show that such a conclusion is correct and irresistible. Those Articles read:'32-A notwithstanding anything in Art. 32, the Supreme Court shall not consider the constitutional validity of any state law in any proceedings under that Art. unless the constitutional validity of any central law is also in issue in such proceedings. 131-A (1) notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have jurisdiction to determine All questions relating to the constitutional validity of any central law. 144-A (1) the minimum number of judges of the Supreme Court who shall sit for the purpose of determining any question as to the constitutional validity of any central law or state law shall be seven. (2) a central law or a state law shall not be declared to be constitutionally invalid by the Supreme Court unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the judges sitting for the purpose of determining the question as to the constitutional validity of such law hold it to be constitutionally invalid. 226-A. Notwithstanding anything in Art. 226, the High Court shall not consider the constitutional validity of any central law in any proceedings under that article. 228-A (1) no High Court shall have jurisdiction to declare any central law to be constitutionally invalid. (2) subject to the provisions of Art. 131-a the High Court may determine All questions relating to the constitutional validity of any state law. (3) the minimum number of judges who shall sit for the purpose of determining any question as to the constitutional validity of any state law shall be five: provided that where the High Court consists of less than five judges, All the judges of the High Court may sit and determine such question. (4) a state law shall not be declared to be constitutionally invalid by the High Court unless, (a) where the High Court consists of five judges or more, not less than two-thirds of the judges sitting for the purpose of determining the validity of such law, hold it to be constitutionally invalid; and (b) where the High Court consists of less than five judges, All the judges of High Court sitting for the purpose hold it to be constitutionally invalid. (5) the provisions of this Art. shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this part. Explanation. In computing the number of judges of a High Court for the purpose of this article, a judge who is disqualified by reason of personal or pecuniary bias shall be excluded. ' the vital changes brought about by the Articles in respect of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts and regarding its exercise were: (1) in a petition under Art. 32 of the constitution, the Supreme Court could not decide constitutional validity of the state law except in a case in which the validity of any central law was also involved. (2) in a petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, the high courts had no jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of central laws but could decide the validity of state laws. (3) only a bench consisting of a minimum of seven judges of the Supreme Court could decide the constitutional validity of law that too only by a two-thirds majority. (4) only a bench consisting of not less than five judges of the High Court could decide the constitutional validity of law that too only by a two-thirds majority. thus, it may be seen, conditions which were not existing from the date of commencement of the constitution on the exercise of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the high courts in relation to the adjudication of cases involving constitutional validity of the laws were imposed by the parliament by enacting the 42nd Amendment to the constitution. Having incorporated such conditions even on the Supreme Court and the high courts for the exercise of the jurisdiction and power to decide the constitutional validity of the laws, it is difficult, nay impossible, to agree that Articles 323-a and 323-b of the same act intended to authorise the appropriate legislature to constitute a tribunal and to confer on it the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the laws, on the topics specified in the two articles. No doubt that All the above Articles which imposed such conditions on the exercise of the power of the Supreme Court and the high courts to decide the constitutional validity of the laws, were deleted, by the constitution 43rd Amendment and thereby the status quo ante 42nd Amendment was restored. However, in view of the well-settled principles of interpretation discernible from the decisions of the supreme court, extracted earlier, for the purpose of ascertaining the true scope and ambit of Articles 323-a and 323-b of the constitution, the other provisions introduced by the 42nd Amendment act as a part of single legislative scheme are relevant and they throw a flood of light on the crucial point arising for consideration and give a conclusive indication that the jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity of a law was not at All intended to be conferred on a tribunal to be constituted under a law enacted by the parliament or state legislature under Art. 323-b. 15. Further, a contrary view would lead to astounding results. There can be no doubt that the power to decide constitutional validity of laws includes the power to decide as to whether an Amendment to the constitution is invalid on the ground that it affected the basic structure of the constitution. Take for instance a civil servant, who is dismissed from service, while challenging the legality of the order, by which he was dismissed, on the ground that second opportunity after the findings were recorded by the inquiring authority was not given, chooses to challenge the constitutional validity of section 44 of the 42nd Amendment act on the ground that the Amendment of Art. 311 (2) deleting the requirement to give second opportunity affects the basic structure of the constitution, the tribunal constituted under the act could also decide such question, and to the exclusion of the high courts. 16. Similarly, a state legislature, in view of the provisions of Art. 323-b, which is similarly worded as Art. 323-a, could enact a law constituting a tribunal to decide disputes arising, inter alia under land reforms laws or taxation laws and exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters, in which event such a tribunal would also be invested with the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the provisions of such law but not the high court. Further, such a tax tribunal could also decide the validity of the 46th Amendment to the constitution by which the definition of the word 'sale' was expanded which is the subject-matter of several writ petitions before this court. Certainly such a result was not intended. 17 (1). Therefore, I am convinced that the interpretation placed on Art. 323-a by the learned advocate-general, the learned counsel for the petitioner and other learned counsel who supported them to the effect that the exclusion of jurisdiction of All courts except the supreme court, which certainly includes high courts, by a law enacted by the parliament which could be provided for under Art. 323-a (2) (d) , was only in respect of matters relating to adjudication of disputes and complaints by civil servants concerning their conditions of service or recruitment as regulated by law and not in respect of the jurisdiction of high courts to decide questions of constitutional validity of any law which regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants is unexceptionable. (2) once we ascertain the true meaning and ambit of the constitutional provision, the extent of divesting of the jurisdiction of the High Court which it had under Art. 226 and its conferment on the administrative tribunal, gets clearly demarcated and the high courts and the tribunal have to exercise their jurisdiction within the respective field. In this behalf, it is of utmost importance to always bear in mind that supremacy of the constitution is the very basis of our constitutional structure. This aspect is forcefully expounded by justice gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India, thus: 'the commission believes that in a democratic country like India which is governed by a written constitution, supremacy can be legitimately claimed only by the constitution. It is the constitution which is paramount, which is the law of laws, which confers on parliament and the state legislatures, the executive and the judiciary their respective powers, assigns to them their respective functions and prescribes limitations within which the said powers and functions can be legitimately discharged. '18. With this background, if we examine the definition of the word 'service matters' or 'matters relating to recruitment' used in the Act, the conclusion which is irresistible is that All disputes and complaints relating to service matters and recruitment, could only be disputes and complaints falling with the purview of Art. 323-a of the constitution. The words used and defined in the act cannot have wider meaning than the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Art. 323-a for the reason that the act is enacted in pursuance of Art. 323-a and therefore the scope and ambit of the powers of the tribunal cannot be wider than the one contemplated under Art. 323-a of the constitution. 19. For these reasons, after anxious and careful consideration of the matter, I answer the question set out in the first paragraph of the order, as follows: 'on the coining into force of the administrative tribunals Act, 1985, and the establishment of the central administrative tribunal the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the constitution of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that Art. before it, challenging the constitutional validity of any law regulating recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union, and decide such petitions stand excluded and did not get vested in the central administrative tribunal. '20. I must, however, add that the discussion which yielded the answer as above, itself indicates that the administrative tribunal constituted under section 4 (1) or 4 (2) of the act has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of All disputes and complaints relating to conditions of service or recruitment, raised by civil servants of the union and the concerned stale respectively within the framework of the law regulating the conditions of service and consequently the jurisdiction of the high courts in respect of such matters even under Art. 226 which could be affected only by another provision in the constitution, stands denuded to that extent by the force of constitutional provision, namely, clauses 2 (d) and (3) of Art. 323-a. "