KURUVALLI SHIVALINGAPPA Vs. Y S M BASAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that falls for determination in disposing of this I.A. which is for staying the operation of the judgment and decree under appeal is, whether the appellant who is now in possession of the house property, described as suit schedule II item, is his self acquired property and therefore should be taken out of the perview of the decree.

(2.) It is submitted that the said Item No. II of the suit schedule property was the property of the partnership firm of which the appellant, husband of the first defendant, 2nd defendant and other mcmbers.of the family were partners and on the dissolution of the firm as evidenced by Ex. D.2, the said Item No. 2 of the suit schedule property was allotted to the share of the appellant's father who was one of the original partners.

(3.) In support of the above proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of NAR A YANAPPA Vs. BHASKARA KRISHNAPPA (AIR 1966 SC 1300) In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that the interest of the partners of a family in the partnership assets was movable property and the document evidencing the relinquishment of interest in such property was not cimpulsorily registrable under Section 17( 1) of the Registration Act. Their Lordships in that manner affirmed the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and over-ruled the decision rendered by the High Court of Madras in AIR 1931 Mad. 580. No doubt, Sri B.P. Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant did not want us to focus our attention on what the Supreme Court held, but specifically drew our attention to the discussion of English Case law on the subject and the nature of the property contributed by the partner or acquired by the firm in the course of its trade or business. His proposition is that all properties, whether moveable or immoveable, once brought into the firm by partners or acquired by the firm in the course of its business or activities, becomes moveable properties and as such even if a house, as in the instant case, is passed on by mere a deed of dissolution to one of the partners, it conveys title and therefore, the father of the appellant had acquired independent title to the suit property. Our attention was specifically drawn to the passage occurring in paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in NARAYANAPPA'S case supra:-