K R BHASKARANANDA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Some of the petitioners are saved operators and the remaining are the operators on the Inter-State Routes. Each one of them has applied for renewal of their stage carriage permits before the second respondent. The 4th respondent-Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (Cor- poration in short) has also made applications on each one of the routes concerned herein for grant of permits. Thus the applications filed by the petitioners for renewal of their permits and the applications filed by the 4th respondent for grant of permits on the very routes are pending before the second respondent. At this stage the petitioners have approached this Court seeking a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of the second respondent on the ground that she being a member of the Board of Directors of the 4th respondent is disqualified in law to function either as a member or as the Chairman of the second respondent. In addition to this prayer there are various other prayers made in each one of these writ petitions, but the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have submitted that the other prayers may be treated as given up. Therefore the other prayers are not considered. The only prayer for issue of a writ in the nature of prohibition to the Transport Commissioner refraining her from functioning as the Chairman or a member of the second respondent is considered.

(2.) Having regard to the contentions urged, the point that arises for consideration is whether the Transport Commissioner who is an official director of the 4th respondent - Corporation, is disqualified to function as the Chairman or a member of the Karnataka State Transport Authority.

(3.) It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Transport Commissioner who is appointed as a Director of the Corporation is connected directly with the management or operation of the Transport undertaking of the Corporation, therefore she is disqualified from holding the office of the Chairman or a member of the Karnataka State Transport Authority (KSTA for short). It is contended that as a Chairman of the KSTA she has to decide the rival contentions of the private operators and the Corporation while granting or renewing the permits, therefore she being the person connected with the management and operation of the transport undertaking of the Corporation cannot be expected to discharge the functions as Chairman or as a member of the KSTA without any institutional bias. As the office of the Chairman of the KSTA and the office of the Director of the KSRTC are held by one and the same person, the functions and duties of both the offices are intermingled, there is every possibility that the interest of the Corporation is likely to weigh in the mind of the Chairman while deciding the rival contentions of the parties. In addition to this reliance is also placed on sub-sec- tion(lH) of Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with Rule 91 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules 1963. These provisions have a bearing on the exercise of power by the Chairman of the K.S.T.A. Sub-section (1H) of Section 47 of the Act though it relates to a preference being given to the State Transport undertaking, as held by the Supreme Court in Sher Singh v Union of India (AIR 1984 S.C. page 200), where all things being equal the State Transport undertaking is entitled to preference. Therefore it is necessary for the authority, before giving effect to rule of preference, to determine as to whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the K.S.R.T.C. is capable of operation on the additional routes keeping in view the interest of the travelling public. (See also AIR 1986 SC 2039 and AIR 1988 S.C. 18). In addition to this it is also contended that in the case of difference of opinion amongst the members of the K.S.T.A., the Chairman has got a casting vote, therefore the Chairman has got the last say in the matter, hence the Chairman being the director of the Corporation which is also an applicant before the authority cannot be expected to take a dispassionate view in the matter. At any rate, the test, to find out whether there is a bias in favour of the Corporation, is not what the deciding officer feels about it or assures that he/she will be acting impartially, but what a reasonable litigant feels about the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the State that the Transport Commissioner will not be directly connected with the management and operation of the State Transport undertaking and as such he or she as the case may be, cannot be disqualified to hold the office of the Chairman of the K.S.T.A. or a member thereof. It is also further submitted that sub- section(2) of Section 44 of the Act contains a rule of statutory exclusion, therefore even if the Transport Commissioner is connected with the management or operation of the State Transport undertaking, in law, he or she as the case may be is eligible for discharging the functions of the Chairman of the K.S.T.A. In addition to this an affidavit of the Transport Commissioner is filed assuring to the Court that in the discharge of her duties as the Chairman of the K.S.T.A. she will be impartial and she will not give scope for any such thing so as to give an impression to the applicants before the authority that there is a bias towards any one of the applicants before it. It is also stated in the affidavit that the Transport Commissioner is not actually concerned with the day to day administration of the undertaking and it is the Managing Director who attends to the day to day administration of the undertaking.