M LRAMCHANDRASETTY Vs. M LNAGAPPASETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two cases may be conveniently disposed of by the same order as the points involved for consideration in both are practically identical. The order sought to be revised in both cases in one passed in a suit dismissing two applications one of which, I.A. No. IV was filed by a son of the plaintiff and the other I.A. No. VIII by the sons of the defendants for being added as parties in the suit. The original plaintiff now being dead the petitioner in I.A. No. IV has been impleaded s one of his legal representatives and in view of his being thus made a party in the case Sri Somasekhara Rao, the learned counsel, represents on his behalf that there is no need to consider the correctness of the order so far as he is concerned. The defendants and their sons have applied separately in these two cases for the order being set aside with respect to I.A. No. VIII.

(2.) The pleadings in the case are lengthy, the properties involved are of considerable value and the contest between the parties seems to be acute over several matters. It is sufficient for the purpose of these cases to state that the suit is for partition and that the plaintiff is the elder brother of defendants 1 to 8 and defendant 9 is their mother. The share claimed by the plaintiff is however, more than what is conceded to the defendants and for this a will said to have been executed by the father and consented to by the defendants is relied upon. This is disputed by the defendants. The main reason for rejecting the application. I.A. No. VIII as mentioned in the order is that in a suit for partition it is necessary only to make the head of each branch in the family a party and that defendants 1 to 8, who are plaintiff's brothers, represent each branch of the family and safeguard the interests of that branch. The learned Judge has apparently overlooked the fact that for upholding and enforcing the claim of the 'plaintiff it is not enough that the defendants are consenting parties to the arrangement and that the arrangement is such as would bind not only the defendants but their family including the petitioners in I.A. No. VIII. The contention of the sons is that whatever may be the truth or effect of the arrangement between their fathers and the plaintiff in the eye of law, they are entitled to impeach it and this they propose to do by themselves independently of the defendants.

(3.) Sri Lakshminaranappa the learned counsel argued that the defendants and their sons being still joint the sons cannot in the absence of any intention on their part to separate, intervene in the proceedings and if they are allowed to do so it would lead to unnecessary complication and prolongation of the suit. He further urged that persons cannot be added as parties against the plaintiff's will as he is the dominus litis and that in any event the order being interlocutory and discretionary cannot be interfered with in revision. 30 My. H.C.R. 321 and 44 My. H.C.R. 319 are cited as authorities against interference. These cases no doubt lay down that interlocutory orders in pending cases are not lightly to be interfered with, and interference is called for only in cases of irreparable injury. Strong reliance was placed on the recent decision in Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Makras, A.I.R. (36) 1949 P.C. 156: (76 I.A. 67), where Sir John Beaumont observed that there can be no justification whatsoever for the view that Section 115 was intended to authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate Courts. This case is however distinguishable in regard to the circumstances under which observation was made as it related to an order in the course of a suit which was disposed of and the decree in which could be appealed against. As regards the correctness of the proposition laid down in these cases governing interference there is no doubt. Since these authorities do not preclude interference but only confine it to cases of exceptional kind and to cases in which irreparable hardship would follow from failure to interfere the question is whether this is a case of that kind.