(1.) KARNATAKA Ordinance No. 3/1997 by which S. 11 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1996 stood amended (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') was challenged by the respondents in Writ Petition Nos. 15380 and 15982 of 1997. The Ordinance was alleged to be discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that satisfaction as contemplated under Art. 213 of the Constitution of India was not indicated while issuing Ordinance. There did not exist any immediate necessity warranting issuance of Ordinance particularly after the election process of the Market Committees was over and the results had been declared. The proposed amendment was alleged to be conferring powers upon the executive which would give scope to exploitation of farmers and agriculturists. The action of the State Government was alleged to be mala fide intending to take over the control of the constitution of the Committees. The impugned Ordinance was alleged to have been promulgated with the object of upsetting the democratic verdict given by the agriculturists in the APMC elections. The impugned Ordinance was further alleged to be intended to take away the right of the elected members of the Committees to choose their Chairman and Vice-Chairman and was likely to defeat the object of the Act. The Ordinance was also stated to be politically motivated. The writ petitions were allowed by the learned single Judge vide the orders impugned in these appeals mainly on the ground of the Ordinance being the result of mala fides as was allegedly evident from the time chosen for its promulgation. The learned single Judge held that : Reported in AIR 1998 Kant 91.
(2.) DURING the course of the arguments, it was conceded before us that the Ordinance stood lapsed on the count of passage of time as no Bill was presented in the Assembly within the statutory period. The arguments of the learned counsel were confined to academic issues only. The learned Advocate General vehemently submitted that the Ordinance, being a law, within the meaning of Art. 367 r/w. Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, could not be quashed on the ground of mala fides. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the various Judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court.
(3.) IN R. K. Garg v. Union of India, (AIR 1981 SC 2138) the Apex Court while considering the scope of Art. 123 of the Constitution of India held that under that Article legislative power was conferred on the President exercisable when both the Houses of the Parliament were not in session. Such a power was termed to be a legislative power and was held to be co-extensive with the power of the Parliament to make laws. There was no qualitative difference between an Ordinance issued by the President and an Act made by the Parliament.