K. VIJAYAKUMAR Vs. NAZMUNNISA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this petition, the petitioners have called in question the correctness of the order dated 25th of January 1991 made in H.R.C. No. 1861/1982 by the Court of Additional Small Causes Judge at Bangalore, directing eviction of the petitioners from the petition schedule premises under Section 21(1)(a) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

(2.) THE brief facts of the case, which may be relevant for the disposal of this petition, may be set out as hereunder.

(3.) HOWEVER , the learned Counsel for the landlady strongly supported the order under revision. He pointed out that the rent receipt Exhibit P-2 strongly relied upon by the petitioners clearly establishes that the first petitioner has taken the petition schedule premises on lease in his individual capacity. According to the learned counsel, merely because, in the rent receipt, it is stated that the amount was paid by the partnership firm, it will not make the firm i.e., the second petitioner, a tenant in respect of the petition schedule premises. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the landlady that the first petitioner has only been described as a partner of M/s. Repute Hardware i.e., the second petitioner. Therefore, he submitted that in this background, if the learned Small Causes Judge, after considering the entire evidence on record, has also recorded a finding that the firm was not registered on the date of the lease of the petition schedule premises, to come to the conclusion that the second petitioner was not the tenant and the first petitioner was the tenant of the petition schedule premises, the said finding does not call for interference by this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 50(1) of the Act. Insofar as the finding of the learned Judge with regard to the eviction of the tenant under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the pleadings in the case clearly show that the landlady sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that the petition schedule premises is reasonably and bona fide required by her for the purpose of the business of her husband-Mohd. Ibrahim and her son K. Ashraf. He further pointed out that the evidence of P.W. 3 shows that the son of the landlady had discontinued his studies and was getting training under him for the purpose of business. He also pointed out that the evidence of P.W. 2 and the dissolution of the partnership also show that differences had arisen between the husband of the landlady and the partners of the partnership firm, in which he was a partner, and, therefore, he came out of the partnership. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that under these circumstances, since the petition had been pending consideration eversince the year 1982 and in view of the specific pleading in the case that the petition schedule premises is required for the purpose of the son of the landlady also, there is absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that on account of the death of the husband of the landlady during the pendency of the proceedings, the claim made by the landlady under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act does not survive for consideration. He submitted that the learned Judge, after elaborately considering the evidence on record, has recorded the finding that the petition schedule premises is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlady and the said finding does not suffer from any infirmity. He further submitted that though the claim made by the petitioner for eviction of the tenant under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act has been negatived, the evidence on record shows that the first petitioner is a very rich person having a godown situated very close to the petition schedule premises, wherein he can carry on his business and further he is also having another business premises just opposite to the petition schedule premises, wherein admittedly the brothers of the first petitioner along with the his father were carrying on business; and since the father of the first petitioner has expired and since it is admitted that the first petitioner is residing along with his brothers, there cannot be any doubt that the business carried on in the premises situated opposite to the petition schedule premises is the business of the first petitioner though he disputes it. He also submitted that admittedly the first petitioner-tenant has failed to pay the rent within two months from the date of receipt of the notice Exhibit P-3 and, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Judge that the tenant has committed default in payment of rent even after the receipt of notice and, therefore, he is liable to be evicted under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, is unexceptionable. He further pointed out that the first petitioner having taken the newly constructed petition schedule premises on rent of only Rs. 300/- per month, without any justification, from the very beginning having committed default in payment of rent and having come forward with a false plea that the landlady is required to adjust the rent out of the advance paid, does not deserve any consideration at the hands of this Court. He further submitted that the eviction petition having been pending ever since the year 1982 and the other children of the landlady, apart from the aforesaid Ashraf, having come up of age and without any avocation, if at this stage the order under revision is set aside, the landlady will be put to irreparable injury and hardship. He submitted that this not a case where the tenant is in financial difficulties or where he is incapable of finding any alternate premises. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that looked at from any point of view, this is not a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of the Act.