A C ANANTHA SWAMY Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS group of writ petitions raises just one point namely the question as to whether the land tribunal at Bangalore which is hearing the cases was justified in passing the order dated 30-6-1998 refusing to transfer the pending applications to the special deputy commissioner and insisting on going on with the cases. The reason why there are about 20 writ petitions is because there are that many applicants. A contention was raised before the tribunal by the petitioners to the effect that since the lands in question were originally inam lands that the designated authority under law who is empowered to hear and decide the applications is the special deputy commissioner and not the land tribunal. The respondents who are the applicants and the land owner: etc. Pointed out to the tribunal that this litigation has had a long history and that even on the last occasion when the case came up to the high court by way of W. P. No. 26983 of 1997 that my brother vishwanath, j. , through order dated 23-10-1997 refused to interfere with the interim order passed by the tribunal whereby the present petitioners had desired that the validity of the form No. 7 should be decided as a preliminary issue. The case was remanded to the tribunal with a direction that it should proceed with the hearing. It was therefore contended before the tribunal by the respondents' learned advocates that even as late as last year the petitioners had not raised any objection to the tribunal's jurisdiction that after the remand order from the high court as many as 17 witnesses have been examined and the next witnesse's evidence is incomplete, that the case has made substantial progress and is close to being decided and that in this background, the application is an afterthought, that it is belated and that it should not be entertained. The tribunal refused to transfer the cases, one of the obvious reasons being that both on this occasion as also on an earlier occasion in March 1994, the high court had remanded the cases to the tribunal and at no time had any objection been raised with regard to the correctness of that authority hearing the disputes.

(2.) APPEARING in support of the petitioners, the learned Advocate Mr. srinivasan pointed out to me that act No. 26 of 1979 which was really an amendment to the inams abolition act whereby the cases of the present type were sought to be entrusted to the tribunal for decision has been struck down by this court and that the act itself has been declared to be ultra vires and the state government accepted the verdict of the high court pursuant to which the circular dated 30-8-1997 was issued whereby it was very clearly pointed out that the special deputy commissioners were required to hear and decide all pending cases of this type including those which would have otherwise gone to the tribunal. Mr. Srinivasan pointed out that there can be no dispute about the fact that the lands which are the subject-matter of this litigation are inam lands and he contended that consequently the statutorily designated authority is the special deputy commissioner which position has been clarified by the state government in its circular and he therefore maintained that if the tribunal insists on proceeding with the case that it would be acting without jurisdiction and that ultimately whatever orders the tribunal passes would be stillborn. On this ground, he justifies the petitioners having moved the tribunal for transfer of the cases to the special deputy commissioner. One of the problems in the way of the tribunal apparently was that normally, the power to transfer is not a power which would have vested with that forum and consequently, it does appear that the tribunal felt handicapped in the face of this position. More importantly however, since the case had been remanded to the tribunal and since it was a substantially part heard matter, the tribunal expressed the view that it was competent to hear and decide the dispute. Mr. Srinivasan's contention is that in the face of the legal position the tribunal's order is unjustified and that therefore the same ought to be quashed.

(3.) ON behalf of the respondents, I have heard the different counsels. The first submission canvassed by them is that the application has been made very late, that the proceeding is substantially part heard, that even if the applications were to be granted for any reason that it would only elongate and dilate the litigation and the learned counsel brought it to my notice that unlike the petitioners, the respondents are people of ordinary means and effectively small persons who are fighting for their rights and that in this background any restarting of the litigation would be disastrous to them. The reason why the learned counsel highlighted this aspect of the case was because they wanted to demonstrate to this court that real prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the applications were to be granted and they submit that on the ground of delay alone, these writ petitions should be dismissed.