(1.) BEING aggrieved by theorder dt. 31-10-95 in MVC. 1209/90 passed by the Prl. Civil Judge and Addl. MACT. , Bailhongal, in rejecting the claim petition on the ground that it was barred by time, the petitioner/appellant has questioned it in this appeal.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are the petitioner was owner of a she-buffaloe which met with an accident on 5-2-89 as a result of which it died. The petitioner who is the owner filed petition on 26-10-90 claiming compensation in a sum of Rs. 12,000/- in MVC No. 1209/90. The said petition came to be rejected. The petitioner also filed an application to condone the delay. The respondents filed objections as a result of which the petitioner, let in evidence on the said the contentions raised in the affidavit filed along with the I. A. The learned Civil Judge after assessing the evidence has come to the conclusion that the claim petition must be filed within six months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The Court is entitled to entertain application filed beyond the period of six months but not later than twelve months. Therefore he has held that the Court has no discretionary power to entertain an application filed beyond that period. In this case admittedly the claim petition came to be filed beyond one year seven months and 21 days. Under those circumstances the claim petition of the petitioner came to be rejected. This finding of the learned Civil Judge is questioned in this appeal and it does not require any more reasoning to allow this appeal in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 2155, Dhannalal v. D. P. Vijayvargiya. In that judgment their Lordships have considered the effect of repeal of sub-sec. (3) of S. 166 of the M. V. Act. The object of the amendment repealing sub-sec. (3) is to save victims of the accident from grave injustice being caused due to rejection of the petition on the ground of limitation. Considering the M. V. (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came into force w. e. f. 14-11-94. Their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the benefit of repeal would be available to the claimant and the petition could not be dismissed on the ground that at the time of its filing, it was barred by limitation under sub-sec. (3) of S. 166 of the Act. The order came to be passed on 31-10-95 subsequent to the coming into force of the Amendment Act as referred to above. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent on the Civil Judge to extend the benefit of repeal of sub-sec. (3) of S. 166 of the M. V. Act. Thus, without going into the merits of the case, I hold that this appeal deserves to be allowed. However, from a perusal of the order it is clear that the learned Civil Judge has not considered the other questions in regard to the rash and negligent driving, compensation to be awarded, etc. Under those circumstances, the matter will have to go back to the learned Civil Judge to consider the case on merits. In the result therefore, I proceed to pass the following :orderthe appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside directing the learned Civil Judge to consider the main petition in accordance with law giving full opportunity to both the parties in MVC. 1209/90 and dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible. Appeal allowed.