SHASHIKALA Vs. MAHADEVAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's revision against the order of the lower appellate Court which reversed the finding of the trial Court in the matter of granting temporary injunction and granted temporary injunction prayed for in favour of the plaintiff.

(2.) The plaintiff brought the suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his peaceful possession of the suit schedule property which he claimed to have fallen to his share at a family partition. The trial Court refused him the injunction on the ground that he had not disclosed the fact that there was a suit pending in the same Court filed by the defendant seeking declaration that the suit schedule property was jointly owned by her and the plaintiff. She placed reliance on the affidavits filed by some of the neighbours who deposed to the fact that the defendant was in joint possession of the property and the plaintiff was never in possession even after the suit sale deed was executed. That the plaintiff is the purchaser of the suit schedule property from one Narasappa who acquired title to the suit schedule property by virtue of the partition itself is not in dispute.

(3.) In O.S.No. 65 of 1987 filed by the present Revision petitioner the trial Court vacated the injunction which it granted earlier after recording a prima facie finding that Narasappa was actually in exclusive possession of the suit schedule property in that suit which is also the suit schedule property in O.S.No.12 of 1988. The lower appellate Court has relied upon that prima facie finding recorded in O.S.No.65 of 1987 in regard to Narasappa's exclusive possession and has therefore reasoned that if the vendor was in exclusive possession and the same was sold to the present plaintiff namely, Mahadappa, then he was entitled to the injunction which he had prayed for. In other words, the lower appellate Court has more or less reasoned that the reasoning of the trial Court was perverse because in respect of the same suit schedule property it cannot in one suit come to the conclusion that Narasappa was in exclusive possession and in another suit it cannot come to the conclusion that it is in the joint possession of Narasappa and the present revision petitioner Shashikala. If there was perverse reasoning by the trial Court, then the lower appellate Court was justified in interfering with the order and granting the relief to which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled. Therefore, this is not a fit case wherein this Court should interfere under Section 115 of C.P.C.