SYED ISSAQ Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/claimant assailing the judgment and award, dated 16.01.2010, passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Dharwad, in S.C. No.36/2006, whereunder the accused/appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of five years and to pay fine of Rs.75,000/- being the value of the dowry received by him and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year, and also convicted for the offence under Section 6 of the Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of six months and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, and acquitting of the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Insofar as offences under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 313 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, accused Nos.1 to 6 were acquitted.

(2.) The brief facts of the case are that, The marriage of accused No.1 with Smt. Shahnaz Begum (P.W.4) was performed on 11.12003 as per the muslim customs and a sum of Rs.75,000/- was received by the accused by way of dowry. In addition to the said dowry, five tolas of gold, a godrej almirah, cot, table fan, filter and other household articles were given in marriage. It is further alleged that on 112003, during the reception, accused No.5 again demanded a fridge and a washing machine from the complainant. When the said demand was brought to the notice of the mother of the complainant, she fainted and was treated by the doctors. It is further alleged that on 001.2004, at about 8. 30 p.m., all the accused persons, in furtherance of their common object, made a demand to pay another sum of Rs.25,000/- in lieu of fridge and washing machine. When the complainant expressed her inability, accused persons abused her and threatened her of dire consequence. On 07.02004, the complainant informed these demands and the act of cruelty to her father. Her father sent her back to her matrimonial house asking her to adjust to the situation. In the meanwhile, the complainant got pregnant. When this fact was informed to the accused on 25.03.2004, at about 9.00 p.m., all the accused stated that they did not want a child through the complainant and assaulted and kicked on her stomach. On 20.04.2004, at about 11.00 p.m., the husband tied her legs and hands and kicked on her stomach. As a result, she suffered severe bleeding and abortion. It is further alleged that the accused failed to give her any medical assistance and, instead on 21.04.2004 she was sent back to her parents house. On 13.05.2004, accused No.1 came to her parents' house on a motor cycle when she was alone in the house and forced her to return to his house and used criminal force against her. It is further alleged that on 31.05.2004, the other accused came to her house and abused her in vulgar language for not fulfilling the dowry demand and for refusing to return to her matrimonial house. As the said acts were unbearable, a complaint was lodged on 28.06.2004. On the basis of the said complaint, a case was registered in Crime No.22/2004.

(3.) The main grounds urged by Sri A.C. Purad, learned counsel appearing for the appellant are that the judgment and order of conviction is contrary to law and material facts. He further contended that the trial court erred in convicting the appellant/accused for the offences under Section 3 and 6 of the Act. He further contended that when the appellant/accused persons has been acquitted for the offences under Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506, 313 read with Section 149 and Section 4 of the act by holding that the evidence of P.W.4, the wife of the appellant/accused is tainted and not trustworthy to rely upon, the Trial Court ought to have given the benefit of doubt and ought to have acquitted the appellant/accused even of the offences under Sections 3 and 6 of the Act. He further contended that the Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective. When the Trial Court has come to the conclusion that the evidence produced under section 4 of the Act has not been proved, accused No.1 ought to have been acquitted under Section 3 and 6 of the Act, as Section 4 is parental section which deals with similar aspects which are contained in Sections 3 and 6 of the Act. He further contended that the accused, in order to substantiate his contention, has led evidence by examining D.W.1, the elder brother of accused No.1 to show that because of transport transaction, he received a demand draft for a sum of Rs.75,000/-. The Trial Court only on the ground that the drivers, who used to pay the amount, have not been examined and no documents have been produced in that behalf, has come to the conclusion that the amount received under the demand draft to the extent of Rs.75,000/- is the dowry amount and wrongly convicted the appellant/accused without proper appreciation of the evidence of D.W.1. He further contended that the evidence of D.W.1 ought to have been appreciated on the principles of preponderance of probabilities and not on the basis of strict proof of the case as that of the prosecution. He further contended that though thee is no demand of dowry and acceptance of dowry, the Trial Court, only on assumptions and presumptions, has come to a wrong conclusion and has convicted the appellant/accused under Sections 3 and 6 of the Act. On these grounds, he prayed for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and order and to acquit the appellant/accused of the alleged offences.