T P LAKSHMI NARASAMMA Vs. RAJALAKSHMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER herein is the landlord of the premises in question, of which, respondents herein are the tenants. The premises in question is a residential premises. The petitioner-widow purchased the premises in the year 2000. She filed H.R.C. Petition No.229/2004, for evicting the respondents under Section 31 (1)(a) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). The memorandum of the petition discloses that the petition schedule premises was let out by the previous owner B.N. Srinivasa to S.M. Reddy and after the death of S.M. Reddy, his legal representatives continued as tenants of the premises. After the purchase of the property by the petitioner, the respondents allegedly not paid the rents. It is further pleaded that the petitioner is the widow and she requires the petition schedule premises for the bona fide use and occupation of her and her family members. In response to the notice, the respondents appeared through their advocate. But, they did not file the affidavit stating the grounds on which they seek to contest the application for eviction. In other words, they did not obtain the leave of the Court to contest the matter. However, the respondents filed their statement of objections and adduced evidence. PETITIONER also adduced her evidence. After hearing, the trial Court dismissed the eviction petition on the ground that the petitioner is not entitled to get possession of the property under Section 31 (1)(a) of the Act as the premises is neither leased by her nor by her husband, but, the same was leased by her vendor.

(2.) SRI M.N. Gupta, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the tenants have not obtained leave of the Court below to contest the matter by filing an affidavit as required under Section 42 (6) (b) of the Act and that therefore, the tenants are not entitled to have their say in the matter for opposing the eviction petition. It is further contended that the Court below was not justified in dismissing the eviction petition on the ground that neither the widow nor her late husband had leased the property. He further points out that the trial Court has held that the jural relationship between the parties is proved. Per contra, it is contended by SRI V.S. Narayan, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents-tenants that Section 31 (1) (a) of the Act clearly discloses that if the premises is let out by the widow or by her husband, the widow is entitled to the benefit of Section 31 of the Act, which is a special provision for evicting the tenant. In this matter, admittedly, neither the widow nor her husband had leased the property. Wherefore, according to him, the trial Court is justified in dismissing the eviction petition. He further submits that even if tile tenants have not obtained leave of the Court to contest, it is open for them to show to the Court that the petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.

(3.) AS could be seen from Section 31 of the Act, it is clear that, if the premises are let out by the widow or by her husband, the widow is entitled to recover possession under Section 31 of the Act. In this matter, admittedly neither the widow (petitioner) nor her husband had let out the premises to the tenants. The premises was leased by the vendor of the petitioner herein. The language employed in Section 31 of the Act is plain and simple. No other meaning can be attached to widow's right to recover immediate possession of the premises. Only if the premises was let out by her or by her husband and not by any one else, widow can recover possession of demised premises immediately under Section 31 (1) of the Act. But that does not mean that there is total bar for the widow to get the tenant evicted for all times to come. Proviso to Section 27 (2)(r) of the Act specifies that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under Clause 27 (2)(r) of the Act unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of acquisition. The said proviso makes it amply clear that the transferee landlord will have to wait for one year after the purchase of the property for filing the eviction petition. If a widow becomes a landlord in relation to the tenanted premises, she in terms of proviso to Section 27 (2)(r) of the Act cannot evict the tenant before the expiry of one year from the date of purchase. When the two provisions of the same statute become applicable in a given case, a harmonious construction should be taken recourse to. It is well settled that a statute should be read in a manner which would give effect to all the words used in the Act. Section 31 (1) of the Act has to be harmoniously read with Section 27 (2) (r) of the Act. If the rule of harmonious construction is not applied, Sections 31 (1) and 27 (2) (r) of the Act would lead to an anomaly. Such an anomaly can be erased if negative test contained in proviso to Section 27 (2) (r) of the Act is applied in the construction of Section 31 (1) thereof, that is to say, as in terms of earlier provision, the transferee landlord cannot evict a tenant before expiry of one year from the date of purchase, Section 31 of the Act which provides for immediate recovery of tenanted premises, would not be applicable. By applying the rule of harmonious construction as aforementioned, this Court can safely conclude that if a widow becomes a landlord in relation to a tenanted premises, she, in terms of Section 31 (1) of the Act, cannot evict the tenant before expiry of one year from the date of purchase, if neither the widow nor her husband had let out the premises. Explanation-I appended to clause (r) of sub-Section (2) of Section 27 of the Act provides for presumption in favour of requirement of the landlord, if the landlord in his application supported by an affidavit submits that the premises are required by him for occupation of himself or for any member of his family. The rule as enacted by the above said Explanation is available not only for the purpose of Section 27(2)(r) of the Act, but also for Section 31 of the Act. The presumption enacted by the Explanation-I appended to Clause (r) of sub-Section (2) of Section 27 of the Act is mandatory and has to be drawn in view of the phraseology employed by the legislature in enacting the provision which speaks "the Court shall presume that the premises are so required". The presumption has to be drawn, of course, the tenant may rebut the presumption. The mandatory presumption enacted by the Act shall have the effect of shifting the burden of proof; while the landlord may rest on the presumption till it is rebutted. (as observed in the case of P. Suryanarayana (Dead), by LRS Vs K.S. Muddugowramma 2004 (3) SCC 589). Therefore, the widow in order to get the benefit of the provision of Section 31 of the Act will have to show her requirement as contemplated under Section 27(2)(r) of the Act. In view of the same, the provisions of Section 27 (2)(r) of the Act are to be read with Section 31 of the Act. While deciding the application filed under Section 31 of the Act, both the provisions have to be read harmoniously. It is clear from Sections 28 to 31 of the Act that the right to immediate possession accrues to a class of persons. Section 31 of the Act reveals that, in the event of premises being required by a widow for herself or for any one of her family members, she may apply to the Court for recovery of immediate possession of the premises. The theory appears to be that a widow should not be at the mercy of law's delay. The legal presumption arising in favour of the landlord's requirement under Explanation-I to Clause (r) of Section 27 (2) of the Act is also made available to Section 31 of the Act. The widow has to prove her requirement for the purpose of getting an order under Section 31 of the Act in the manner as she is required to prove under Clause (r) of Section 27 (2) of the Act. But the widow is vested with right to immediate recovery of possession under Section 31 of the Act. AS has been held by this Court in the case of Smt. K.S. Muddugowramma Vs P. Suryanarayana & Others (ILR 2003 (1) KAR 775) , the present Act provides comprehensive remedies and imparts operational speed and modernizes the whole law for the good of the community. The Court will implement the law based on the policy decision of the legislature. Therefore, the provisions of Section 27 (2)(r) including the proviso to Section 27(2)(r) of the Act also will have to be read in the aid of Section 31 of the Act to avoid anomaly. If Section 27(2)(r) of the Act is ignored while dealing with the matter under Section 31 of the Act, then, the legislative intention will be frustrated. It is relevant to note that Section 31 (1) of the Act is akin to Section 14D of Delhi Rent Control Act. Proviso to Section 27 (2)(r) of the Act is akin to Section 14 (6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The aforesaid provisions read thus : While dealing with similar situation under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Apex Court in the case of Nathi Devi "Vs- Radha Devi Gupta (AIR 2005 SC 648), has observed that the widow-landlord can file eviction petition after five years from the date of purchase. It is relevant to note that Section 14 (6) of Delhi Rent Control Act prescribes five years waiting period after the purchase. In that context, the aforementioned observation is made. While coming to the said conclusion, the Apex Court has applied the rule of harmonious construction. In this Context, it is relevant to note Paragraph -29 of the aforecited judgment, which reads thus: "Para-29: If a widow becomes a landlord in relation to the tenanted premises, she in terms of Section 14(6) of the Act cannot evict the tenant before expiry of five years from the date of purchase, as noticed hereinbefore. When two provisions of the same statute become applicable in a given case a harmonious construction should be taken recourse to." By relying upon the aforementioned judgment and by applying the rule of harmonious construction, this Court is of the considered opinion that the widow-landlord cannot file eviction petition within one year from the date of purchase in case if neither she nor her husband has let out the premises. Consequently, in such an event there is no bar for filing eviction petition after one year from the date of purchase. In this mater, admittedly the widow "landlord has filed the eviction petition after four years from the date of purchase of premises. Therefore, there is no hurdle for the widow to get the tenants evicted. This aspect of the matter is overlooked by the Court below.