LAWS(KAR)-1997-9-21

GIRIMALLAPPA Vs. CHAIRMAN REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY BELLARY

Decided On September 22, 1997
GIRIMALLAPPA Appellant
V/S
CHAIRMAN, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BELLARY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CERTAIN residents of Bellary Town have preferred the present petition whereby they have challenged the action on the part of the respondent-authorities in shifting the bus stand from the Royal Circle which was known as Adoni Bus Stand to a place near the Sangam Theatre. The authorities concerned had issued two notifications, the first dated 3-4-1997 whereunder the bus stand was sought to be shifted and the second notifications with which we are concerned here is the one dated 26-3-97 whereunder the authorities had directed that the buses shall no longer be parked at the Adoni Bus Stand i. e. the old Bus Stand. It is this notification that has been challenged. Mr. D'sa, the learned Senior Govt. Counsel who appears for the Respondents had brought it to the notice of the Court that the challenge is virtually academic and of no consequence unless the notification shifting the bus stand itself is challenged because once the earlier notification becomes final, there can be no question of anybody insisting on the buses being parked at the old Adoni Bus Stand and it was only because of certain incidents whereby buses were sought to be defiantly parked at Old Bus Stand, that the second notification became necessary formally prohibiting any such acts. This issue is not of much consequence because there is on record an application for permission to challenge the notification shifting the bus stand and in any event, in the course of the arguments both the learned counsel have dealt with that question also and hence, it is unnecessary to go into that aspect of the matter. Mr. Rao, learned counsel who represents the petitioners has drawn my attention to 3 decisions of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1973 SC 2420, AIR 1987 SC 1339 and AIR 1995 SC 458 (Sic) in support of his contention that the provisions of S. 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act do not invest the authorities with the power of shifting a bus stand and he points out that if at all there is a reference in the Act to this power that it is in Ss. 96 (2), 21 and 22. I do concede that in the cases before the Supreme Court some observations have been made which support the submission canvassed by Mr. Rao. However, the facts of the cases are very different which is why they are distinguishable. I have carefully considered the submission canvassed by Mr. Rao on this point and to my mind, it would be difficult to accept the contention even if a very technical view of the matter is taken. On the other hand, Mr. D'sa who represents the respondents points out to me that the ambit and scope of S. 117 is broad enough to take into consideration a situation of the present type. I am in agreement with this submission because it will be seen that if an authority has power to set up a bus stand or if an authority has the power to decide which will be the halting place of the buses, then it is implied that the authority can also exercise the power of shifting the bus stand. This contention on behalf of the petitioners will therefore necessarily have to fail.

(2.) THE, next ground of challenge emanates from the fact that the decision is attacked as being arbitrary and hasty. There is also a challenge on the ground of mala fides and I shall consider this aspect of the matter along with the earlier two. Mr. Rao has demonstrated to me that the authorities intend constructing a regular permanent bus stand at some distance and that the work on this project has been commenced. He states that as and when that bus stand is operational that the authorities ought to have shifted once and for all instead of causing unpleasantness to the operation and to the passengers by insisting on their shifting to a temporary bus stand at the present spot which was wholly and completely unnecessary. He points out to me that the place chosen by the authorities is unsuitable because there are cinema theatres, a hospital and other institutions around the area and furthermore, that the taxi stand was close to the Adoni Bus Stand and that it was extremely convenient for the passengers to use that place. In support of the plea of mala fides, he demonstrates to me that the Corporation authorities are putting up a large commercial complex on that spot and that it is his contention that there are various vested interests who are keen on that project and that it is these persons who have insisted on the bus stand being shifted in a hurry. Mr. Rao submits that the temporary arrangement was unnecessary and furthermore that the wishes of the members of the public ought to have been taken into consideration. Relying on the decision reported in AIR 1994 SC 988 he has contended that under the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, that it was open to the citizens to insist on public notice being issued and the wishes and convenience of the members of the public being taken into consideration. The attack is basically on the basis of arbitrariness and mala fides and in support of this plea Mr. Rao demonstrated that the sudden shifting to a place where no infrastructure was present is liable to be quashed since it was not in the public interest.

(3.) DEALING first with the factual position Mr. D'sa demonstrates to me that it is incorrect to state that there was any haste or hurry involved apart from the record which he has placed before the Court and which I have perused. He points out that the area in question was extremely congested and it was very necessary to shift the bus stand to a nearby convenient spot as the traffic situation had become impossible. He states that it was not desirable to wait until the new project was completed because some immediate solution to the congestion problem had to be found. As regards the shop complex Mr. D'sa has pointed out that this was a time-bound project under a World Bank loan and therefore it was necessary to commence the work without any further delay which was one of the reasons why a temporary bus stand was thought of. He also points out to me that it is false to say that the citizens did not have notice because an earlier writ petition had in fact been filed and secondly, it was very much to the public knowledge for several months that the alternate temporary bus stand was going to become operational. He has also demonstrated from the file that the Deputy Commissioner held a series of conference with the various police, revenue and other authorities before giving final shape to the shift. On the ground of arbitrariness, Mr. D'sa has submitted that relocation of the bus stand was something that had to be decided on the basis of what the various authorities and experts pointed out and that there is no requirement of law whereby the matter should be publicly notified or what objections should be invited. In sum and substance, he submits that the decision is a perfectly legitimate one and that no interference is called for.