(1.) THE petitioner herein impugns annexures-b and c proceedings of the respondent. Annexure-B is the order passed by the respondent after enquiry under Section 7-a of the employees' provident funds and miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' ). Annexure-C is the consequential notice issued. The contention of the petitioner is that the period of infancy available to the petitioner is to be reckoned from the date of manufacture, i. e. , 30-6-1992 and not 18-7-1991 as now assigned.
(2.) THE facts of the case in brief are as follows: the petitioner-establishment, according to the petitioner was established to manufacture plywood and other articles. The factory, according to the petitioner, comes within the ambit of Section 1 (3) (a) of the act. It is not a commercial establishment which is coverable under Section 1 (3) (b ). The respondent herein initiated proceedings for coverage under the act reckoning the date of the alleged sale took place on 18-7-1988. Admittedly, on 18-7-1928, the petitioner purchased certain quantity of plywood and sold the same, which, according to the petitioner, was with an intention to secure market for the commodity which it intended eventually to manufacture. The respondent, therefore, treated this establishment as the one coming under Section 1 (3) (b) of the act and proceeded to assign the infancy period from 18-7-1988 and thereafter granted 3 years' period of infancy. The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is not engaged in the sale of commodities manufactured by other concerns, but it is a factory. It commenced production with effect from 30-6-1989 and, therefore, the period of infancy should be reckoned 3 years from thereafter. This was the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent.
(3.) IT is an admitted fact that the petitioner had purchased certain quantity of plywood from M/s. Nainy plywood factory for a sum of Rs. 3,13,868. 81. It was marketed for a sum of Rs. 3,23,110. 31. Therefore, this activity carried on by the petitioner was admittedly prior to starting commercial production on 30-6-1989. This transaction cannot be ignored totally. It is the activity which converts the petitioner into an establishment which comes one under Section 1 (3) (b) of the act. If, as a matter of fact, it would come under Section 1 (3) (b), the question then would be, whether on the date on which it carried on the activity, it had the required number of employees; that is to say, if there are 20 or more workers, the Provisions of the act would be attracted. If it is shown that the number of workers are more than 20 then even if the establishment comes under Section 1 (3) (b), the Provisions of the act will be attracted. The premises of the respondent that the petitioner would then come within the ambit of other establishment contemplated under Section 1 (3) (b) is correct. The transaction by the petitioner cannot be ignored in computing the coverage under the act. But it is begging the question as to whether on the date on which it carried on the transaction, it had more than 20 workers. If it did not have 20 workers, it would not be "other establishment" coming within the ambit of the act. That is an issue to be resolved by further evidence. A fresh adjudication is, therefore, called for in this behalf.