LAWS(KAR)-1997-9-45

MISHRIMAL SONAJI OSWAL Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Decided On September 08, 1997
MISHRIMAL SONAJI OSWAL Appellant
V/S
STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RESIDENTIAL premises bearing Nos. C. S. 42, 43 and 44 in Ward No. III of Bijapur City were leased-out by the appellant for running Government Primary School. He filed HRC No. 60 of 1981 under Section 21 (1) (a), (j) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the 'act') for possession of the aforesaid premises. The petition was allowed by the Munsiff, Bijapur. The District Judge and the High Court confirmed the action of the Munsiff. As the respondents failed to resist the claim of the appellant for eviction, they resorted to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, Notification under Section 4 (1) was issued by the Appropriate authority in pursuance of which the appellant filed his objections. It is submitted that without holding an enquiry or affording the appellant an opportunity of being heard, the respondents issued the final notification. It was submitted that as the acquisition proceedings were tainted with mala fide and were intended to harass the appellant the same were liable to be quashed. The action of acquisition was also challenged on the ground of violation of the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice. It was contended that the proceedings were aimed at defeating and nullifying the fruits of the HRC decree obtained by the appellant. The petition was resisted on various grounds as detailed in the objection statement filed on behalf of the respondents. While denying the averments made by the appellant it was submitted that the acquisition of the premises was initiated for a public purpose. The violation of the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice was denied submitting that in response to the notice issued by the Land Acquisition Officer the appellant had filed his objections which were considered along with the replies obtained from the Assistant Educational Officer, before passing the final notification. Recommendations in terms of Section 5-A were made on 31-12-1985. Copy of the report under Section 5-A was served on the adult male member of the joint family of the appellant as he was allegedly in the habit of avoiding notices. In pursuance of the report submitted under Section 5-A of the Act the Government passed orders to acquire the premises in question. During the course of the arguments the record was produced showing that the appellant had made claim before the Land Acquisition Officer on 28-8-1986 claiming a grant of Rs. 7,25,000/- as compensation with all statutory allowances. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in V. T. Krishnamoorthy v State of Karnataka, the petition was dismissed on 31-1-1996. At the request of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant the matter was again heard and the prayer of the appellant to refer the matter to the Division Bench was rejected on 7-6-1996. It was held that the writ petition already stood disposed on merits and no grounds was made-out to reconsider the orders pronounced on 31-1-1996.

(2.) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that after the coming into force of the Central Land Acquisition Act, it was only the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 3 (ee) of the Act who could have initiated the acquisition proceedings and not the Deputy Commissioner, as is alleged to have been done in the instant case. It is further submitted that mere application for payment of compensation is no ground to debar a citizen from challenging the acquisition proceedings.

(3.) THE plea that the acquisition proceedings had not been initiated by a Competent Authority after the enforcement of the Central Act is apparently an afterthought and carved-out only for the purposes of the filing present appeal. No such plea appears to have been raised either in the pleadings or at the time of the arguments. The plea as to whether the action of acquisition was initiated by the Competent Authority is the question of fact which could have been decided only on the basis of the pleadings. Such a plea cannot be raised and permitted at this belated stage. Acquisition of the sites being admittedly for a public purpose cannot be set aside on mere technicalities which are prime facie far fetched from realities.